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1	LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS
2	INC. IN ITS CAPACITY AS
3	PLAN ADMINISTRATOR ON
4	BEHALF OF LEHMAN BROTHERS
5	SPECIAL FINANCING INC.,
6	Plaintiff,
7	v. Adv. Case No. 13-01689(SCC)
8	LCOR ALEXANDRIA L.L.C.,
9	ET AL.,
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11	Defendants.
12	x
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15	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
16	One Bowling Green
17	New York, New York
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19	August 4, 2015
20	10:03 AM
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22	
23	BEFORE:
24	HON SHELLEY C. CHAPMAN
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Page 3 1 Hearing re: 08-13555 - Doc# 50217 Motion for Approval of 2 Settlement Agreement Among Putnam Structured Product CDO 3 2002-1 LTD., Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 LLC, U.S. 4 Bank National Association, as Successor Trustee, Lehman 5 Brothers Special Financing Inc., and Lehman Brothers 6 Holdings Inc. 7 8 Hearing re: 08-13555 - Doc# 50296 Motion for Entry of an 9 Order Authorizing Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. to 10 Invest Disputed Claim Reserves for Claim Numbers 67733 11 Pursuant to Section 8.4 of the Modified Third Amended Joint 12 Chapter Plan of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its 13 Affiliated Debtors 14 15 Hearing re: 08-13555 - Doc# 50054 Motion for Objection to 16 Claim(s): The Plan Administrators Supplemental Objection to 17 the Four Hundred Thirty-First Omnibus Objection to Claims 18 (Reduce and Allow Claims) 19 20 Hearing re: Adv. 08-01420 - Doc# 12478 Trustees Motion for 21 an Order to (I) Establish a Third Interim Distribution Fund 22 for General Unsecured Creditor Claims, (II) Release Reserves 23 from the Secured and Priority Claim Reserve, the First 24 Interim Distribution Fund, and the Second Interim 25 Distribution Fund, and (III) Make a Third Interim

Page 4 Distribution to Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Creditor Claims with a Record Date of July 10, 2015 Hearing re: Adv. 09-01120 - Status Conference Hearing re: Adv. 13-01689 - Motion to Amend Complaint Transcribed by: Dawn South and Sheila G. Orms

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		Page 5
1	APPEARANCES:	
2	WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES	
3	Attorneys for the Debtor	
4	767 Fifth Avenue	
5	New York, NY 10153-0119	
6		
7	BY: JACQUELINE MARCUS, ESQ.	
8	CANDACE M. ARTHUR, ESQ.	
9		
10	KEESAL, YOUNG & LOGAN	
11	Attorney for the Debtor	
12	450 Pacific Avenue	
13	San Francisco, CA 94133	
14		
15	BY: NATHAN JASKOWIAK, ESQ.	
16		
17	HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP	
18	Attorneys for the SIPA Trustee	
19	One Battery Park Plaza	
20	New York, NY 10004-1482	
21		
22	BY: MEAGHAN C. GRAGG, ESQ.	
23	JEFFREY S. MARGOLIN, ESQ.	
24		
25		

1 g 0 01 120	
Page 6	
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP	
Attorney for U.S. Bank National Association, as	
Trustee	
111 West Monroe Street	
Chicago, IL 60603-4080	
BY: FRANKLIN H. TOPP III, ESQ.	
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP	
Attorneys for the Creditors Committee	
51 Madison Avenue	
22nd Floor	
New York, NY 10010	
BY: SUSHEEL KIRPALANI, ESQ.	
SCOTT C. SHELLEY, ESQ.	
MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP	
Attorneys for the Official Committee	
28 Liberty Street	
New York, NY 10005-1413	
BY: DENNIS C. O'DONNELL, ESQ.	
GERALD UZZI, ESQ.	
	Page 6 CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP Attorney for U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee 111 West Monroe Street Chicago, IL 60603-4080 BY: FRANKLIN H. TOPP III, ESQ. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP Attorneys for the Creditors Committee 51 Madison Avenue 22nd Floor New York, NY 10010 BY: SUSHEEL KIRPALANI, ESQ. SCOTT C. SHELLEY, ESQ. MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP Attorneys for the Official Committee 28 Liberty Street New York, NY 10005-1413 BY: DENNIS C. O'DONNELL, ESQ.

	Page 7
1	GWILLIAM, IVARY, CHIOSSO, CAVALLI & BREWER
2	Attorney for the Plaintiffs
3	1999 Harrison Street
4	Suite 1600
5	P.O. Box 2079
6	Oakland, CA 94604-2079
7	
8	BY: J. GARY GWILLIAM, ESQ.
9	
10	REED SMITH LLP
11	Attorney for Bank of New York Mellon
12	599 Lexington Avenue
13	New York, NY 10022
14	
15	BY: DAVID M. SCHLECKER, ESQ.
16	
17	PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
18	Attorneys for Citibank
19	1285 Avenue of the Americas
20	New York, NY 10019-6064
21	
22	BY: STEPHEN J. SHIMSHAK, ESQ.
23	KYLE KIMPLER, ESQ.
24	
25	

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	Page 8
1	ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
2	Attorney for Plaintiff Wong
3	Post-Montgomery Center
4	One Montgomery Street
5	Suite 1800
6	San Francisco, CA 94104
7	
8	BY: JASON C. DAVIS, ESQ.
9	
10	DPA PIPER
11	1251 Avenue of the Americas
12	New York, NY 10020-1104
13	
14	BY: THOMAS R. CALIFANO, ESQ.
15	SPENCER STIEFEL, ESQ.
16	
17	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
18	Attorneys for Lehman
19	51 Madison Avenue
20	22nd Floor
21	New York, NY 10010
22	
23	BY: CALLI RAY, ESQ.
2 4	ANDREW J. ROSSMAN, ESQ.
25	LINDSAY M. WEBER, ESQ.

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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning, please have a seat. 2 3 Okay. Good morning, everyone. How are you?

MS. ARTHUR: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record, Candace Arthur of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, on behalf of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. as the plan administrator.

Your Honor, we filed an amended agenda letter yesterday evening, and if it please the Court, I'll go in the order of the items listed.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MS. ARTHUR: The first item on the agenda before the Court is the plan administrator's uncontested motion pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, seeking approval of a settlement agreement amongst Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 LLC, Putnam Structured Product CDO 2002-1 LTD., and U.S. Bank National Association, in its capacity as successor trustee.

Your Honor, we filed a motion on July 6th, it's reflected on the docket as entry number 50217, and we filed a declaration of Mr. Lawrence Branman (ph) in support of the motion yesterday, and that's reflected on the docket as 50519.

In addition, Your Honor, the trustee has filed a

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declaration in connection with the motion as well, and that's on if docket as 50487.

Your Honor, both Mr. Branman and counsel for the trustee are in the court today.

Your Honor, the settlement agreement is another one of the resolutions we have been able to arrive at in connection with the STB flip clause disputes.

Specifically with respect to this matter it resolves the estate's claims against Alta (ph) CDO SPC and the distributions that it made.

I would like to state on the record that the amounts reflected in the motion in connection with the distributions were incorrect, and the correct amounts are set forth in Mr. Branman's declaration.

As Mr. Branman's declaration provides, the Alta CDO SPC trustees distributed approximately \$410 million of which the Putnam trust received approximately 42.5 million, and it's the plan administrator's position that LBSF was due and owing approximately 15.8 million. So the settlement agreement does resolve the issues that we have with respect to that transaction.

The plan administrator submits that the settlement agreement was entered into after arms length negotiations and is in the best interest of LBSF's estates and its creditors.

Page 11 1 There were no objections to the motion or the 2 settlement agreement, and subject to any questions that the 3 Court may have, the plan administrator respectfully requests 4 entry of an order approving the motion and approving the 5 settlement agreement as well. 6 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 7 Does anyone wish to be heard with respect to the 8 plan administrator's motion for approval of a settlement 9 between LBSF and Putnam. 10 Good morning, how are you? 11 MR. TOP: Good morning, Your Honor, Frank Topp 12 from Chapman and Cutler on behalf of U.S. Bank National 13 Association. 14 And I just wanted to confirm for the Court's 15 record that not only were no objections filed in the 16 bankruptcy docket itself, but we have received no objections 17 from any noteholders or anything like that in connection with this. 18 19 THE COURT: Excellent. Excellent. 20 MR. TOP: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Thank you very much. All right, the 22 motion will be approved. Thank you. 23 MS. ARTHUR: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 The second matter on the agenda will be handled by 25 Mr. Susheel Kirpalani.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, Mr. Kirpalani.

MR. KIRPALANI: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record Susheel Kirpalani from Quinn Emanuel on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors of Lehman Brothers and LBHI as plan administrator.

Judge, we're here this morning on the motion of LBSF to invest a portion of the disputed claims reserve pursuant to Section 8.4 of the plan. The notice and the motion are docket 50295 and 50296, and they were filed on July 14th, 2015. The objection deadline was July 28th, 2015. And we filed a notice of transaction documents along with some exhibits on July 30th.

The exhibits are namely a filed form of the intercompany note and security agreement that LBSF would enter into with LBHI, as well as a deposit control agreement in order to better secure LBSF in its security interests at LBHI, and a revised form of order, which happily to report, Your Honor, we reached after agreement and substantial discussions with Citibank, who had expressed some concerns to us prior to filing, and we wanted to try to work all of those out, which we did.

All of the motion papers were served via ECF on the dates that we filed them. And as noted in the letter to Your Honor on July 31 there were no objections filed.

We filed a certificate of no objection yesterday

on August 3rd, and that's docket 50513.

Just to give the Court some context. Your Honor may recall that the plan administrator filed a similar motion corresponding with JPMorgan's derivatives claim against LBSF, that was docket 40673 last summer,

August 22nd, 2014, and this Court entered an order on September 10th of last year at docket 46276 granting that relief. And so I just wanted to reorient the Court to why are we doing these things, what does it actually accomplish?

It accomplishes two things.

First in situations that are unique like the

Citibank litigation they developed some trapped cash, it has

nothing to do with the merits of litigation, it's just a

matter of logic even more than amount, it's -- there's some

trapped cash, and the reason for that is LBSF, pursuant to

the plan, has to reserve the full amount of the maximum

potential claim and the distributions that would be payable

there.

So take Citibank's claims and LBSF are at most \$1.599 billion. At LBSF's current distributions at 34 cents on the dollar that's about \$543 million of cash that's just sitting at LBSF earning next to nothing, and it can't go anywhere. At the same time because of Citibank's unique position with LBHI, as the Court knows it's hotly contested, they have a deposit account at Citibank that LBHI claims

should be returned to LBHI, and Citibank claims it has a setoff right with respect to that. So there's \$2.069 billion of cash at LBHI, it's actually at Citibank, but -- that belongs to LBHI, and there's the 543 million of LBSF claims.

So this mechanism, which was born last year, which we figured out a way to use here as well with Citibank's consent, is to take the cash or at least the conservative amount of cash that under all circumstances is going to be sitting there somewhere, cash collateralized or however, and move it out of the system, get it into creditors' pockets. And it's going to move out from LBSF to LBHI for further distribution to LBHI's creditors. So that's good for LBHI creditors, because they get money, it's good for LBSF, because the amount that LBSF is going to earn --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KIRPALANI: -- on the amount invested in this cash collateralized note will be 50 basis points higher than what LBSF would otherwise be earning. So it's kind of a win/win situation.

\$560 million. This motion is requesting a similar investment, but the amount is actually going to be \$300 million initially, and it could go up by up to another \$150 million, and that was a negotiated number with Citibank

going through a variety of mathematical scenarios and doomsday scenarios, what could happen, and that was reached conservatively comfortable. So the most it would be would be 450 at some point.

Section 8.4 of the plan requires the establishment of the reserves at each debtor, and as I mentioned, LBSF is reserving about 34 cents on the dollar for disputed claims in the maximum amount.

So this motion is again seeking to unlock a portion using the most conservative and favorable assumptions to the disputed claimants. And we talked to Citibank before we filed the motion, after we filed the motion, and ultimately reached resolution.

And just to be clear, this note is secured by two things. It's secured by LBHI's deposit, so it's an amount that LBHI owes to LBSF, \$300 million. What does it have to back that up with? It's got the amounts that LBHI is owed from Citibank on the deposit, and if Citibank is successful in getting paid from LBHI through the deposit then LBHI will subrogate and have a good claim against LBSF. So it's basically round tripping in the money. So those are the two sources of recovery.

William Montuoro is a senior vice president of
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., submitted a declaration. He
is here in court, Your Honor, the first row there, in case

Page 16 1 anyone has questions. 2 THE COURT: All right. MR. KIRPALANI: I would just like to proffer one 3 change to his testimony that's in his declaration. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. KIRPALANI: In his declaration he talks about 7 the minimum amount mathematically and logically that LBHI 8 would be able to repay would be \$295 million, based on the 9 most conservative assumptions. That number has been moved 10 down to \$266 million. And the reason for that is in 11 discussions with Citibank the assumption under the initial 12 concept was let's say it takes five years to resolve the 13 litigation with Citi --14 THE COURT: Let's not. 15 (Laughter) 16 MR. TOP: Very happy to hear that. Although 17 Citibank said just tacked on two more years to be safe. So 18 we tacked on two more years to make it seven years. 19 THE COURT: We're not getting a smile out of Mr. Shimshak. 20 21 MR. TOP: So we tacked on two more years, again, 22 just in the interest of conservatism, and so now because it's seven years potentially, including potentially post-23 petition interest at LBHI, and because LBSF is just an 24 25 unsecured claim, and we'd never earn and never be paid post-

petition interest, so there's a negative arbitrage as the

Court is well aware. And so the most that -- the most

conservative place to be under the new chart that

Mr. Montuoro submitted -- or that we submitted with the

notice but that he would attest to, if asked to do so, is

266 million should be the new amount of the note, plus

34 million for the amount of legal fees that Citibank would

include in its proof of claim against LBSF.

As the Court knows Supreme Court Second Circuit says just because you're an unsecured creditor doesn't mean you have a -- don't have an unsecured claim for fees if your contract permits it. So we tacked that on as well. Because if LBHI is paying it you could subrogate to the valid unsecured amounts. And so the new number is 300 million, easy, round, and that's really all we have.

We do have copies of the new redlined order if you want to walk through it or if you have it already, whatever you'd prefer.

THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine. Why don't

I ask if anyone else wishes to be heard. Thank you very

much.

MR. KIRPALANI: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SHIMSHAK: Just very briefly, Your Honor. Steve Shimshak, Paul, Weiss for Citi.

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1	As Mr. Kirpalani's presentation indicated the
2	documents were heavily negotiated.
3	THE COURT: Okay.
4	MR. SHIMSHAK: There were significant enhancements
5	in contrast to what was originally offered to make us
6	comfortable with the arrangement, and the result is an
7	agreed order. So we're pleased to go forward.
8	THE COURT: All right.
9	MR. SHIMSHAK: Thank you.
10	THE COURT: Very good. Well notwithstanding the
11	fact that this is indeed an ongoing and hotly contested
12	litigation it's excellent that the parties were able to work
13	out this arrangement, which inures to the benefit of all
14	concerned. I'll approve the motion.
15	MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you very much.
16	THE COURT: Thank you very much. All right.
17	Thank you.
18	MR. KIRPALANI: Your Honor, may I be excused?
19	THE COURT: Yes.
20	MR. KIRPALANI: Okay. Thank you.
21	THE COURT: Thank you very much.
22	MR. SHIMSHAK: Thank you, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: Thank you.
24	MS. ARTHUR: Your Honor, the next matter on the
25	agenda with actually be Lehman Brothers Inc.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Good morning.

MS. GRAGG: Good morning, Your Honor, Meaghan Gragg with Hughes Hubbard & Reed, counsel for James W. Gidden, the SIPA Trustee.

I'm here to address the trustee's motion for authority to establish a third interim distribution fund of approximately \$1.887 billion for purposes of making a third interim distribution to allow unsecured general creditors and release reserves from the secured and priority reserve in the first and second interim distribution funds reserving for remaining unresolved claims, and to authorize the trustee to make the third interim distribution from the LBI estate to allow general unsecured creditors with a record date of July 10th, 2015, which would achieve a cumulative 35 percent interim distribution to LBI's unsecured general creditors.

John Dunn, the declarant, in support of the motion is here in the courtroom today.

Your Honor, I'm personally gratified and the trustee is delighted that we're here before the Court today seeking authority to make a third substantial distribution to allowed unsecured creditors. This is a testament to the effectiveness of the process laid out in SIPA and the Bankruptcy Code as overseen by the Court and SIPC and the collective efforts of the judges, court personnel,

regulators, and professionals who participated in that process, including those working on behalf of creditors.

Over the past year largely as a result of resolving remaining disputed claims the trustee has been able to reduce reserves by \$805 million. As a result we are now in a position with a sufficient pool of available cash to significantly increase the distribution to general creditors.

Should the order be entered the trustee anticipates proceeding with the third interim distribution in early September, increasing the total amount distributed to LBI's general unsecured creditors to approximately 7.5 billion.

We continue to work towards the wind down of the estate as soon as possible, but it is not likely that will occur this year as we still have a number of significant pending litigations before this Court and appellate courts.

Should the Court authorize the third distribution significantly all estate assets will be dedicated to litigation reserves or distribution funds, and any further distribution from the LBI estate beyond the proposed third interim distribution will be contingent on the reduction of existing reserves as a result of successful litigation of the disputed claims, which may not be until the conclusion of the liquidation.

The relief the trustee now seeks, which is detailed in the motion, is consistent with the relief already granted by the Court in the severe and priority reserve order and the first and second distribution orders.

All outstanding general creditor claimants were served with the motion and schedules and had the opportunity to be heard.

We have discussed the motion with certain claimants who had questions about how the relief requested in the motion might affect their claims and the reserves established by the trustee's previous distribution motions.

The trustee did not receive any opposition to the motion, only reservations of rights, which we believe are unnecessary and inappropriate filed by three fully reserved (indiscernible) claimants whose claims for bonuses are subject to litigation pending before this Court.

The trustee contacted the claimants' attorneys to see if they would withdraw, I don't believe they're in the courtroom today.

THE COURT: So are any of the counsel for the three claimants who filed reservations of rights present here today? They did not communicate to you that they were withdrawing their reservations of rights?

MS. GRAGG: No, they did not.

THE COURT: My understanding is that consistent

Pg 22 of 120 Page 22 1 with what you've represented that their claim amounts are 2 indeed fully reserved at the full amounts that they're

MS. GRAGG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So therefore the reservation of rights is what it is and their rights are fully reserved. All right.

MS. GRAGG: Entering this order will benefit creditors, it's supported by SIPC, it's supported by major creditors of the estate, and if you're has any questions I'm here to answer them.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

Does anyone else wish to be heard with respect to the trustee's motion for authority to make an additional interim distribution?

I think it's important, as I have done in the past, to pause and reflect on this accomplishment. I think I said it the last time you were before me seeking to make the last interim distribution, but I very strongly believe that it cannot be said enough.

To go back to September of 2008 folks believed that customer claims would not be fully paid. So not only have customer claims been fully paid, but we are now at 35 cents on the dollar, which those of us who work in the bankruptcy arena know may not sound great to somebody who

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asserting.

would like to have 100 cents, but it's an extraordinary accomplishment in most any case, and it's an incredibly extraordinary accomplishment in this case.

The other side of that coin is the tremendous amount of work that it takes to get there, and often one reads criticism at the level of professional fees that are expended in order to wind down, liquidate, fulfill the mission of the trustee and this estate.

In reviewing the fee applications and in seeing you folks come in here week in and week out and seeing the level of effort that it takes to resolve even what appears to be the most simple claim in terms of the forensic accounting that's involved, the sophisticated financial securities issues, all the way down to what we would think of as ordinary contract disputes, which each have a very real human element that has to be dealt with, because after all there are people on the other end of a lot of these claims, I think that all concerned deserve a tremendous amount of congratulations.

Certainly from the Court's perspective as we continue to operate in a time of budgetary constraints we try our best to keep up with you, because every day that we might have to delay, which I don't believe we do delay very often, means another day that distributions don't get into the hands of creditors who have been waiting all these

Page 24 1 years. 2 So, I'm very happy to approve the motion. My 3 congratulations to everyone who's working. Keep at it, and I'm hoping that the number will go even higher before we're 4 5 done. Thank you very much. 6 MS. GRAGG: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Can we be excused, Your 8 Honor? 9 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. 10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. 12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: May I approach with the 13 order? 14 THE COURT: Yes. Good morning, Ms. Marcus. 15 MS. MARCUS: Good morning, Your Honor. Jacqueline 16 Marcus, Weil, Gotshal & Manges on behalf of Lehman Brothers 17 Holdings Inc. as plan administrator on behalf of BNC 18 Mortgage LLC. 19 Item number 4 on the agenda, Your Honor, is the 20 plan administrator's supplemental objection to the four 21 hundred thirty-first omnibus objection to claims, ECF number 22 50054. This claim objection relates to the proofs of 23 24 claim filed by six former employees of debtor BNC. 25 The last time we were before you with respect to

Pg 25 of 120 Page 25 1 these claims was in October 2014 in response to the claimants' motion for relief from the automatic stay to 2 continue their litigation against BNC in the California 3 state court. The Court denied that motion. 4 5 Before engaging in further litigation regarding the claims the parties tried for the third time to resolve 6 7 these claims through mediation. The third mediation took 8 place in April of this year. Representatives of the plan administrator, BNC's insurance company, and the claimants 9 10 attended, and again the parties failed to reach a 11 resolution. 12 The plan --13 THE COURT: So can I ask you to pause --14 MS. MARCUS: Sure. THE COURT: -- and I'd like to know a little bit 15 16 more about the role of insurance here and also the claims 17 pools at BNC and what the projected distributions are. 18 Excuse me, sir, yes? MR. GWILLIAM: Your Honor --19 20 THE COURT: No, Ms. Marcus is at the podium, I'd 21 like to speak to her for right now. Thank you very much. 22 MS. MARCUS: Okay. So let's start with the role 23 of the insurance company. Excuse me.

there is a retention, a \$5 million retention which has not

As we determined at the state hearing in October

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nearly been approached yet. At that time I think the number that we used was \$795,000 in all Lehman legal fees. And while we have incurred expenses since then, obviously we're not anywhere near \$5 million yet.

So the insurance company has taken the position so far that it's not required to -- I don't know if they've officially said they're not required to defend -- but we haven't exceeded the retention yet.

Nevertheless we did persuade them to attend the mediation, and we believe that if we had been able to come up with a reasonable number that they might have contributed to the settlement at that time, notwithstanding the fact --

MS. MARCUS: -- we haven't exceeded the insured

retention.

THE COURT: Okay.

With respect to the level of claims at BNC there are perhaps a handful of claims with one big exception other than the claims of these six plaintiffs, and depending on what happens with the RNBS trustee claim, that's the big exception, the RNBS trustee claim as you know is being resolved through the claims protocol that the Court approved, that claim was filed against BNC as well as many of the other debtors. So that claim is the one that threatens to really --

> THE COURT: Swamp the pool.

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Page 27 1 MS. MARCUS: Swamp is a good word. Swamp all the 2 creditors. BNC has on hand approximately \$16 million. If the 3 claims of these six claimants were allowed at 35 million 4 they wouldn't be able to pay all creditors in full. 5 6 Depending on what happens to the RNBS claim there might or 7 might not be sufficient funds to make a substantial 8 distribution to BNC's creditors. 9 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I interrupted you, 10 I'm sorry. 11 MS. MARCUS: Okay. No problem. 12 The plan administrator filed a supplemental 13 objection, and as reflected in the agenda, the claimants 14 have filed a supplemental response and the plan 15 administrator has filed a reply. 16 There are a few salient facts that I believe are 17 undisputed that I'd like to just remind the Court of before we delve into the merits. 18 19 Claimants collectively have filed proofs of claims 20 in the aggregate amount of \$35 million, which claims do 21 include punitive damages. 22 Seven years prior to the commencement of BNC's Chapter 11 case, in November of 2005, the claimants resigned 23 from BNC and commenced an action in state court in 24 25 Sacramento asserting a variety of claims.

Page 28 1 BNC ceased its operations in October 2007, more 2 than a year before the commencement of its Chapter 11 case. BNC's estate has approximately \$15 million of 3 cash, and we've already talked about the insured retention. 4 As the Court is aware under the ADR claims 5 6 procedure the first hearing with respect to any claim 7 objection is called a sufficiency hearing. I believe the parties are also in agreement that the standard to be 8 9 applied in this hearing is the same standard applied for a 10 Rule 10(b)(6) motion. 11 THE COURT: 12(b)(6). 12 MS. MARCUS: I'm sorry, 12(b)(6). 13 THE COURT: You've got your 10(b)(5) and your 14 12(b)(6) mixed up. 15 MS. MARCUS: Yep, yep. Thank you, Your Honor. 16 The plan administrator takes issues with many of 17 the six claims -- many facts asserted in the six claims, but 18 many of those issues are factual disputes that would not be 19 appropriate for resolution here today. 20 The supplemental objection was filed really in order to set forth a method -- excuse me -- matters that the 21 22 Court can determine as a matter of law. The plan 23 administrator had two goals in mind. 24 First, by limiting the issues we believe that we 25 would narrow the issues for discovery and save both the

estate's and the claimants' money as we proceed with the claims litigation.

And second, we were hoping that the preliminary holding -- the preliminary rulings would alter the expectation of the claimants thereby making settlement through a mediation or otherwise more likely.

With this in mind the plan administrator concluded that there are three threshold areas that the Court can rule on as a matter of law. Two of them are issues of California law, and with the Court's permission will be handled by Nathan Jaskowiak from Keesal, Young & Logan, BNC's California counsel. Mr. Jaskowiak's pro hac vice motion has already been granted by the Court.

He will speak to whether the proofs of claim have established a claim for defamation under California law, and whether under California law claimants can assert a claim for loss of income after October 2007 when BNC closed its doors.

The third issue is a matter of bankruptcy law, and that is the extent to which the Court should allow any claim for punitive damages against BNC.

Unless the Court prefers otherwise I'll address those issues after Mr. Jaskowiak has said his piece.

THE COURT: Okay. That will be fine. Thank you very much.

Page 30 1 MS. MARCUS: Thank you. 2 MR. JASKOWIAK: Good morning, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Good morning. 4 MR. JASKOWIAK: Nathan Jaskowiak, Keesal, Young & 5 Logan on behalf of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. as plan 6 administrator on behalf of debtor BNC Mortgage LLC. 7 So, I wanted to address two of the three issues 8 that Ms. Marcus has put --9 THE COURT: Right. So let's talk about 10 defamation. 11 MR. JASKOWIAK: Okay. 12 THE COURT: All right? So the claimants respond 13 to the plan administrator's objection by saying -- I'm at 14 page 6 of the response. It says, "Instead debtor only 15 quotes a portion of the allegations. Debtor has left out 16 the defamatory statement this is what was actually pled." 17 And then there's a reference to paragraph 147 of the 18 complaint, which says that -- and the bold is -- the 19 emphasis is added by the claimants, "Published false 20 information to others, disparaging plaintiffs," et cetera, 21 et cetera, and one claimant's work performance and 22 abilities. 23 So your position is that that's wholly conclusory. 24 And my question for you is, under California law is what is 25 required literally an allegation of the statement?

MR. JASKOWIAK: I don't -- I think California law you don't have to say it verbatim, but you have to specifically identify it. So something like this is far too general just saying work performance and abilities, which is really just a subject area, you would have to identify -
THE COURT: The person says you're a terrible worker, you're lazy.

MR. JASKOWIAK: Right. Exactly.

THE COURT: Something like that.

MR. JASKOWIAK: The statement. And then if there's multiple statements identify each of them. I don't think you have to say -- you know, put them in quotes or anything, but you do have to identify each statement. And it's our position that this is just far too general under California law. We're probably the law of almost any other state.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JASKOWIAK: And then with respect to -- they requested leave to amend, and with respect to that there's two points that we make in our reply brief, and one of them is that California law has a qualified privilege through employers to make statements concerning the work performance of its employees, and then also that such statements would be statements of opinion and not statements of fact, and only a statement of fact can form the basis of a defamation

Pg 32 of 120 Page 32 1 claim. 2 So it's our position that leave to amend wouldn't be able to cure either of those issues, and in any event, 3 4 they haven't given an offer of what they would even amend to 5 state. 6 So it's our position that these statements are far 7 too general and that leave to amend should be denied in any 8 event because there's -- it would be futile. 9 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So that takes care 10 of defamation. 11 With respect to the loss of income, and we can 12 talk to counsel for the claimants about this as well, it's 13 undisputed that BNC closed in 2007, and it seems undisputed 14 also that lost wages, vis-à-vis, BNC stops when BNC stops. 15 But what seems to be -- and I searched the complaint, which 16 is attached to the proof of claim, to try to get some 17 clarity around this -- because there seems to be some notion that what's really being claimed is -- well the spin, if you 18 19 will, is a reduced earnings capacity, but then when I go 20 back into the complaint I have a hard time finding that. So 21 is that --22 MR. JASKOWIAK: I think that's right. 23 THE COURT: Do you disagree that there would be a

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claim for reduced earnings capacity?

08-13555-mg Doc 51194 Filed 09/29/15 Entered 10/16/15 10:50:12 Main Document Pg 33 of 120 Page 33 1 they would have needed to allege, and here they're really 2 seeking damages for back pay, front pay, and those are the economic damages that they're seeking. They don't make a 3 claim that they've been unable to work or that they --4 5 THE COURT: Right. So the front pay stops in 2007

when the doors closed in terms of BNC, right?

MR. JASKOWIAK: Right. And I guess it would all be back pay since we're not at a point where we have a judgment.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JASKOWIAK: But yes, either of them would stop when the doors close, I think that's undisputed.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. JASKOWIAK: But I mean, I think, Your Honor, you're exactly right, they don't make an allegation. think it's a purely manufactured claim to try to deal with the fact that BNC is closed and that their economic damages would be cut off, and it's our position that this lost earnings capacity is not a claim that's recognized in California.

They cited the California jury instruction, and it instructs jurors to calculate how long would they have worked at the employer, and to take into account how long they expected the employer would have continued operations. Well we know that, we know how long it continued operations,

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Page 34 1 and that's the cut off for lost wages. 2 One additional point is that they all found jobs, 3 so I don't think Mr. Gwilliam is going to dispute that, but they did all find jobs. 4 5 So it's really our position that this is just a 6 way to inflate their economic damages claim. THE COURT: Okay. All right. 7 8 MR. JASKOWIAK: Oh, Your Honor, I'm sorry, I had 9 one additional issue. 10 I'm not sure if you need me to address it or not, 11 but they had made a claim that we had already filed our 12 answer in the state court, a case about eight years ago, and 13 that we couldn't bring a motion to -- or --14 THE COURT: That's --15 MR. JASKOWIAK: Okay. 16 THE COURT: Right. That's -- we're in a different 17 process now. 18 MR. JASKOWIAK: Okay. THE COURT: And we'll get to that a little bit 19 20 more later. Sir? MR. GWILLIAM: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Your 21 22 Honor, I'm Gary Gwilliam, attorney for all of the plaintiffs 23 in this matter, and it's nice to appear before you. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. GWILLIAM: And I came out from California.

Page 35 1 THE COURT: Welcome. 2 MR. GWILLIAM: Thank you. So I'd like to at this point, Your Honor, just to 3 address the two issues that are before us and then we can 4 5 talk a little more generally about some of the issues that 6 Ms. Marcus brought up. 7 I would point out, Your Honor, that this is an 8 interesting objection. It is a 12(b)(6) objection based 9 upon the pleadings only of a complaint that was filed in 10 2005. So we're dealing, as I understand it, with the 11 sufficiency of a complaint under California law. I think we 12 all agree to that. And that's --13 THE COURT: Okay. Well not so fast. 14 MR. GWILLIAM: Okay. 15 THE COURT: Not so fast. You filed the complaint 16 in California. 17 MR. GWILLIAM: Correct. THE COURT: But most significantly you filed 18 19 proofs of claim in this bankruptcy case. 20 MR. GWILLIAM: We did. 21 THE COURT: So once you filed a proof of claim in 22 this bankruptcy case, to which you attach to complaint in 23 California, that's the basis of your claim. 24 MR. GWILLIAM: Well that's part of it. 25 THE COURT: Well when -- the way the claims

Page 36 1 process works is you have to -- you file a proof of claim, 2 and I'm holding a claim here of Ms. Seymour (ph), and it 3 says basis for claim damages for wrongful termination, et 4 cetera, per attached complaint. 5 MR. GWILLIAM: Right. 6 THE COURT: So that --7 MR. GWILLIAM: But I believe she attached a declaration also, but I don't -- I haven't looked at that 8 9 recently. But that's true, we're looking at the sufficiency 10 of the claim. 11 THE COURT: Well we're looking at the sufficiency 12 of the claim. So there's a claims process here and the 13 basis of your claim is the complaint. 14 The procedures that are in place now and that have 15 been in place for years in this case are in order to 16 facilitate the review of these claims there is a -- what we 17 -- what's come to be called a sufficiency hearing, which 18 everybody agrees is just like a 12(b)(6), whether or not there's enough alleged that gets you out of the starting 19 20 gate. 21 MR. GWILLIAM: Right. 22 THE COURT: So, I just want to somewhat correct 23 your perspective that the way that you're looking at it I'm 24 somehow redoing something that was done in California. 25 This is a claims process that unfolds here now

Page 37 1 until something else happens, which we can talk about later. 2 MR. GWILLIAM: Well, I totally understand that, 3 Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. GWILLIAM: But I believe under 12(b)(6), as 6 under California law, we're looking at the sufficiency --7 THE COURT: Yes. MR. GWILLIAM: -- of the pleading. And under 8 9 sufficiency of pleading laws if we have not pled something 10 appropriately on a complaint that was filed ten years ago we 11 have leave to amend, and oftentimes leave to engage in 12 discovery, if need be, in order to allow us to amend the --13 THE COURT: Alter as a general matter. MR. GWILLIAM: Right. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. GWILLIAM: So given that context, so example, 17 on the defamation claim we filed what I believe is 18 sufficient pleading to put them on notice of what our plan If there is more detail that needs to be gone into I 19 20 would remind the Court that there was almost no discovery, certainly no discovery of any of the defendants. 21 22 THE COURT: Here's the issue that I have, is that 23 the particular portion that we're focuses on --24 MR. GWILLIAM: Right. 25 THE COURT: -- is your allegation of what was said

Page 38 1 to the claimants --2 MR. GWILLIAM: Correct. 3 THE COURT: -- right? There's no discovery 4 required with respect to that. They heard -- they --5 presumably behind your complaint is knowledge of what was 6 said. 7 MR. GWILLIAM: No. 8 THE COURT: No. 9 MR. GWILLIAM: No, because there could be other 10 people that it was published to that the plaintiffs did not 11 hear about. So defamation does not require that the plaintiffs themselves hear all the claims of defamation. 12 13 they are making other claims to other people out there that 14 are defamatory, that are causing them loss of reputation and 15 injury, that may be defamation even though the plaintiff 16 didn't directly hear it. So --17 THE COURT: Well let me try to understand your 18 position --19 MR. GWILLIAM: Right. 20 THE COURT: -- because this is different from what 21 you stated in your pleadings. In your pleadings you stated 22 that under California law the defamatory statement is that 23 there were statements that were made about work performance and abilities and that there was false information 24 25 disparaging the plaintiffs.

Page 39 1 MR. GWILLIAM: Right. But that doesn't require 2 that each plaintiff hear that. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. GWILLIAM: So that's why discovery or further 5 information is oftentimes --6 THE COURT: But how did you know enough to file 7 this complaint? 8 MR. GWILLIAM: Well, I'm sure that they heard it 9 maybe secondhand and some comments were made to them. 10 THE COURT: Okay. And what I'm saying to you is 11 that at a minimum I would expect to see, if not verbatim in 12 more detail, what it is that they heard, otherwise it's 13 impossible to say someone has defamed me. Presumably what 14 you're telling me is they heard, others told them that one 15 of the individual defendants said X, Y, or Z about them. We 16 don't have anything like that here. 17 MR. GWILLIAM: Well we have the allegation that 18 the Court just referred to in our complaint that they did not mention in theirs, that named specifically the 19 20 defendants, Linda Harris, Nick Murphy recklessly published 21 false information disparaging the plaintiffs Colombo, et 22 cetera --23 THE COURT: My point is --MR. GWILLIAM: -- on information and belief. 24 25 THE COURT: Okay. My point is that if someone

Page 40 1 said -- if they heard something you have not even put in 2 what they heard. MR. GWILLIAM: Well typically under a California 3 4 pleading we don't have to do that, it's a liberal pleading, 5 and that's the whole --6 THE COURT: So is your idea that then you would 7 get to trial and then only at that point would there be a 8 revelation of what was said? 9 MR. GWILLIAM: No. I believe that under 10 California law, under 12(b)(6), and under the Demurrer 11 motion to strike if in fact they believe that this is not 12 sufficient they can file a Demurrer for uncertainty and then 13 we can have a second hearing. 14 THE COURT: We're not in California law anymore. 15 MR. GWILLIAM: Right. 16 THE COURT: This is a federal court, I'm in the 17 federal rules of civil procedure, and the case management order of this case. So, I'm not -- I hear you. 18 19 MR. GWILLIAM: Okay. 20 THE COURT: It's the same concept, but you're --21 you are unable to tell me what it is that was said or was 22 heard, and I am having a hard time understanding how 23 consistent with Rule 11 you would be able to file a pleading 24 without having knowledge of what you believe was said, the 25 very words. I'm struggling with that.

MR. GWILLIAM: Well if in fact you needed more information that's the whole purpose of being allowed to amend the complaint in order to give you more. I'd have to sit down and talk about what was said many years ago and go through it.

THE COURT: But --

MR. GWILLIAM: But this pleading --

THE COURT: -- let's just -- I'm going to keep with -- keep with me in the moment. We're back in 2005 and these individuals leave BNC --

MR. GWILLIAM: Right.

THE COURT: -- because you say something happened.

Well what happened was, you say, people said bad things

about them. What? They -- when they came to you -- and I'm

not asking you to violate attorney/client privilege -- they

had to be a factual predicate for embarking on this lawsuit,

and it's common sense purely to believe that that involved

being told what was said.

MR. GWILLIAM: Well we allege that Joe Penick (ph) and Nick Murphy and Linda Harris made disparaging comments about their work performance in the billings. That is indeed a general allegation as is typically done. If more information is needed then the complaint can be amended. But we operated under this complaint for two years, plus -- and never got into it.

So if you wanted me to say I want to know exactly what was said then that's the whole purpose of having a motion to amend.

THE COURT: But if you're telling me right now that your clients, if the question is put to them squarely, what was said about you they would say that -- they would simply say disparaging things. They would not be able to say specifically I was called a name, I was characterized as this, that, or the other thing.

MR. GWILLIAM: No, I think -- you know, I'd have to go back and talk to them about what was said about that. The interest -- no, I think that there was much more specific said. But again --

THE COURT: But then why haven't you pled that?

MR. GWILLIAM: Because it doesn't require -- the

pleadings do not require in California or under the

pleadings law to do anything more than this is a sufficient

pleading. If it's insufficient we have a right to amend and
then we can bring those things in.

Secondly, all the information, particularly in the defamation case, doesn't come strictly from the plaintiff, and that's why oftentimes the court will allow us to move forward towards (indiscernible). Now --

THE COURT: I totally hear you, but you still -there's no good answer to the issue that in the first

instance you have -- you're representing folks who say that this occurred and yet they cannot give any quotes or approximate quotes or anything more specific. Under the law general statements that --

MR. GWILLIAM: Your Honor, with all due respect I entirely disagree with that. You're saying they quote cannot do that. They did not because they were not required to under the California law pleadings that they filed in November of 2005. They filed an adequate complaint that was worked on there. If there's more detail that is needed then that's the whole purpose of their right to amend.

Now oftentimes in cases like this the final motion is on motion for summary judgment. That's where these issues are fleshed out, not at the pleading level, because at the pleading level, particularly on defamation, they oftentimes don't know everything that was defamed about them.

So the whole point of allowing us to have general pleadings and then at some stage later the Court will hear this.

Now when we were here on October 7th, and I read the entire transcript again, you talked about how at some stage you would have to hear dispositive motions. I do not see this as a dispositive motion.

THE COURT: If that's what the transcript says

Page 44 1 then it was an error. I think the context there was your 2 belief that you were ultimately going to try this case back in California, and I was trying to clarify for you the fact 3 that you're part of a claims process here and until I rule 4 otherwise the claims get resolved here. 5 MR. GWILLIAM: Right. 7 THE COURT: And I might have eluded to the fact 8 that if nothing else, no matter where it all shakes out, I'm not going to identify issues before the parties do, that 10 oftentimes there could be dispositive motions here. 11 I quite agree with you this doesn't feel like a 12 dispositives motions case. What this feels like is a case 13 that ought to be settled. 14 MR. GWILLIAM: I couldn't agree with you more. 15 So let's just step back for a minute if you don't 16 mind --17 THE COURT: Sure. MR. GWILLIAM: -- and let me address some of the 18 issues that Ms. Marcus addressed --19 THE COURT: Okay. MR. GWILLIAM: -- because first of all with all 21 22 due respect I want this case settled, we've tried to have 23 this --24 THE COURT: You don't have to say with all due 25 respect, okay? I will assume that you are affording me due

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Page 45 1 respect. 2 MR. GWILLIAM: I'm an old fashion lawyer and I 3 speak that way. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. GWILLIAM: I don't mean any disrespect. 6 That's a term that I -7 THE COURT: Very good. It's a habit. 8 MR. GWILLIAM: Maybe a bad habit. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. GWILLIAM: But, all right. 11 Your Honor, we fully want this case settled. I do 12 not honestly believe that the issues on these objections, on all three of these issues are the variances to the 13 14 settlement. I've been involved in every aspect of this. 15 The variance to the settlement are back on what we call 16 these other claims, and that's been the issue that we've had 17 to deal with. Now these RNBS claims something important has 18 19 happened since we were here on October 7th, 2014. This 20 Court has now entered a detailed chronicle order for all of 21 those mortgages, claims against Lehman, BNC, and others, to 22 be very carefully gone through, litigated, claimed, and as I 23 understand it you had a hearing here not too long ago where 24 they talked about like it would be 50 percent of them going 25 So, I think that that's been --

THE COURT: That's a little bit of a mischaracterization. Of the ones that had already been submitted that had already been reviewed 50 percent didn't make it through, but --MR. GWILLIAM: It just strikes me that when we look at these RNBS claims with the protocol that the Court set that's a tough barrier to find mortgages that are eight or ten years old that you could prove fraud, cause, damage all this time later, and it'll be interesting to see how all of that flows out. THE COURT: I'll be very interested to see. MR. GWILLIAM: Well, I will too, because it affects us to a certain extent. But -- so I -- but what we come back to, Your Honor, that concerns me, and this is a point I really wanted to hit to have you be aware of. There is \$16 million sitting in this BNC trust fund available for distribution. My understanding is that there are no other significant claims other than the possibility of the RNBS claims against BNC other than ours. But in our claim it was in the face value of \$35 million, could be settled within the \$16 million amount. But what concerns me, Your Honor, is that originally they put \$5 million towards equity, now in addition to the \$16 million --

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Page 47 1 THE COURT: Wait, what's the \$5 million towards 2 equity? 3 MR. GWILLIAM: That was towards equity to the shareholders of BNC. Now it's up to \$10 million. 4 5 THE COURT: I don't know what you're referring to, 6 sir. 7 MR. GWILLIAM: There is a bank -- there's a profit 8 and loss statement of BNC that indicates \$16 million is 9 available. In addition to the \$16 million they've allocated 10 \$10 million towards equity to the shareholders. That 11 concerns me that money would go to the shareholder equity 12 before the claims are paid. So --13 THE COURT: We'll have to ask Ms. Marcus if she 14 can address what you're talking about, because I don't know. 15 The only way that the equity, which would be big Lehman, 16 right, the only way that there would be a recovery there, 17 which has happened from time to time, is if all unsecured creditors at BNC are paid in full. 18 19 MR. GWILLIAM: Totally agree. 20 THE COURT: That's the way it works. MR. GWILLIAM: So, I think this becomes important, 21 22 because, for example, when we get to the punitive damages 23 one of the issues is are we going to possibly dilute other 24 claims by a claim of punitive damages, and if there's plenty 25 of money available to pay us off entirely, and if it doesn't

look like there's going to be other claims that are there I don't think that that's a major issue. But maybe we cross that bridge when we get there. But I don't -- I honestly don't feel that this objection hearing is taking us very far forward.

When we were here on October 7th the Court may remember that one of the issues that we talked about was if we're going to get involved in discovery, and you wanted to move this case along expeditiously, you made that very clear and I know that's been your process in all these claims, the expectation that I had is that we would move forward with discovery. You said specifically, and you asked Ms. Marcus to agree, that we could start discovery in California, and I'm pleased to see that we have a California lawyer here from a very fine firm that can engage in discovery, but not one bit of discovery has been done since we were here on October 7th.

Now true we did have another mediation. When I asked that discovery get started and I said let's take the depositions of the plaintiffs, ask them questions about the defamation, ask them questions about their loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity, let's do that. Only one plaintiffs' deposition was every taken years ago. The answer was --

THE COURT: Well that gets to -- the lost earnings

piece gets to the other thing that we need some clarification around, because it is undisputed that BNC closed in 2005. It is undisputed you cannot make a claim for lost wages payable by BNC after the time that BNC closed.

MR. GWILLIAM: And I don't think that's the law in California and I think it is disputed that we can make a claim for that because of the loss of earning capacity.

THE COURT: Well, no, no, no, no. No, let's be very precise. The loss of earning capacity is a different beast entirely. The loss of earnings at BNC stops if there is an entitlement at the moment that BNC closed its doors.

I went back and I read the complaint, I do not see an allegation of diminished earning capacity. And then based on what I've been advised by counsel in this hearing there would appear to be the impediment to that claim.

Again, I don't know what the facts are, I only know what I'm being told, but to the extent that the claimants obtained employment then that is a factor that would go into an allegation -- the merit of an allegation of diminished earning capacity if an individual is terminated.

Putting to one side questions about emotional distress, intentional infliction of motional distress, and all of that, simply economic damages. If the individual were able a month later to obtain a job at a salary similar

to what she earned previously there is no economic damage.

MR. GWILLIAM: No, what concerns me and what concerns me about Mr. Jaskowiak's comment was that he's told this Court that they had gotten jobs. That's not true. Some did and some didn't, but why are we talking about what happened factually if we're still dealing with the pleading issue?

THE COURT: I think the reason that we're talking about what happened factually -- and maybe the thing to do is to pause after this exchange.

What Ms. Marcus explained, which is consistent with what we do routinely with all of these claims, is to find ways to make the process -- to right size the process. And the plan administrator, you disagree, but the plan administrator is explaining a view that this claim -- the parameters of this claim are too large and that therefore if the parameters of the claim were right sized that might facilitate settlement, because there is funding there, the exact distribution to dividend will be uncertain, what is certain is that not a penny leaves until all unsecured creditors are paid in full for their allowed amounts.

The existence of the punitive damages claim, and

I'm not -- I'm disinclined to offer an advisory -- issue an

advisory opinion, but I will tell you -- this proof of claim

is filed here, this is a submission to the equitable

Page 51 1 jurisdiction of the Court. Okay? It's highly unlikely that 2 punitive damages would be allowed as an allowed claim in 3 this court. Not to say hypothetically before a jury you 4 wouldn't be able to get them, but in terms of allowing in 5 the bankruptcy sense a claim for punitive damages highly 6 unlikely. 7 MR. GWILLIAM: Okay. THE COURT: Okay? And I think that what we ought 8 9 to do is take a pause, because I have another matter that I 10 have to get to, and I would very much like, with your 11 permission, to have a conference in chambers for a while and 12 see if we can make a little more progress when we're sitting 13 a couple feet from each other rather than having you behind 14 the podium. 15 MR. GWILLIAM: Very happy and pleased to do that, 16 Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Would you be willing to wait to do 18 that? MR. GWILLIAM: I will wait as long as -- I came 19 20 all the way out here from California today. 21 THE COURT: Well we got some lovely weather for 22 you today, sir. 23 MR. GWILLIAM: Yeah, and my daughter and grandson 24 live out here, so listen, there's some benefits that I'm 25 very happy to have here.

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	Page 52
1	THE COURT: Very excellent.
2	All right. Well if you wouldn't mind taking a
3	seat I'm going to call the next matter and then we'll
4	Ms. Marcus, are you able to stay around?
5	MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	MS. MARCUS: That's a great idea. Thank you.
8	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
9	All right. What do we have next?
10	MS. ARTHUR: Your Honor, the next matter looks
11	like it's a status conference actually, Your Honor, of Ka
12	Kin Wong
13	THE COURT: Yes.
14	MS. ARTHUR: versus Lehman Brothers Special
15	Financing Inc.
16	THE COURT: Okay. So, I'm just kind of playing
17	around with the schedule here. Should we move on to
18	MS. ARTHUR: The next one is the 2 p.m. hearing.
19	THE COURT: You're right, the LCOR is at 2 p.m.,
20	so we're down to these two. Okay.
21	MS. ARTHUR: Yes, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. All right. So
23	why don't you come on up.
24	All right. So this is LBHI, this is Ka Kin Wong
25	versus HSBC. Yes?

Page 53 1 MR. SLACK: That's right. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. SLACK: So this is a case, Your Honor, that was filed back in 2005. We haven't been before you on this 4 5 case ever, so this is the --6 THE COURT: It was up visiting with Judge Batz --7 MR. SLACK: And that's exactly right. 8 THE COURT: -- among others. 9 MR. SLACK: And what this case concerns, it may 10 help just to do a little background. 11 This is a complex derivative structure. And the 12 way this worked, Your Honor, is that there was an entity 13 called Pacific Finance that issued notes, which sometimes 14 are referred to here as minibonds, and they were in 15 different series, and that's important because each series 16 had their own set of transaction documents. 17 The plaintiffs here are the noteholders or mini bondholders at the Pacific Finance level. And Pacific 18 19 Finance then entered into a derivative with LBSF. What's 20 interesting is, is that at what we call the minibond level 21 that trust and the trustees do not have what Your Honor has 22 probably seen as a change in the waterfall provision. doesn't have that at all, it just says in fact in that -- at 23 that level that LBSF gets paid first whatever it's owned and 24 25 then money goes out to the mini bondholders.

The collateral at that level, at the minibond level was notes from another trust at the sapphire level.

So at the sapphire level again you had a more traditional trust, you had notes issued, Pacific Finance bought those notes, and that's the collateral at the minibond level. At that level there is a change in the waterfall. And BNY is the trustee at that level.

So, Your Honor, when the first complaint was filed back in 2009 it had a direct claim against LBSF and others, and Judge Peck heard a motion to dismiss in that case.

While the motion to dismiss was pending I would note the plaintiffs made a motion to withdraw the reference the first time that Judge Swain denied. Judge Peck then heard the motion to dismiss, granted the motion to dismiss, and it went up to Judge Pauley. Judge Pauley affirmed the dismissal of the direct claims, allowed the plaintiffs to amend to bring derivative claims on behalf of the trust, and also sent back a claim for a constructive trust which Judge Peck had dismissed for Judge Peck to clarify the reasons why that also should be dismissed based on a standing issue.

So a new motion to dismiss was --

THE COURT: Which he then did?

MR. SLACK: He did not, he didn't address it because that was in the new complaint where there was a new motion to dismiss.

So the amended complaint was filed, the amended complaint had the derivative claims and then reallege the constructive trust claims.

A new motion to dismiss was filed in 2011, and while that motion to dismiss was pending there were two things that happened. One was that the plaintiffs again moved to withdraw the reference. And the other thing was that there was a settlement -- a fairly complex settlement that was taking place in Hong Kong related to all of the trusts at the sapphire level, at the minibond level, it included the trustees in LBSF. That settlement required a number of different steps. It took some time to implement. It had a process by which each of the series of notes had to vote individually, and the votes were essentially in the high 90's. And there's a list in the letter we sent, there's a list of the voting percentages, and it's -- they're all -- each series voted again in the high 90's to approve the settlement.

There were -- this settlement was effectuated through the derivatives procedures order in front of Judge Peck, and there was an objection to an amendment to the derivatives procedures order. Judge Peck held that again the minibond plaintiffs here did not have standing to challenge the change and amendment to the derivative procedures order. That was also appealed to Judge

Sullivan. Judge Sullivan affirmed Judge Peck saying that the plaintiffs here were not parties in interest for purposes of the bankruptcy in order to have standing to challenge the change to the derivatives procedures order.

So another --

THE COURT: Under a -- their creditor is a creditor's theory?

MR. SLACK: Exactly. That's exactly right.

So that brings us to essentially where we are now, which is that the new motion to withdraw the reference was denied, and that motion had been pending for four years, and a fully briefed motion to dismiss but briefed again more than four years ago is now pending in front of Your Honor.

We've had some conversations with the plaintiffs. It's certainly our view, we think correct, that the settlement here completely resolves these matters, because when you're suing derivatively on behalf of the trust and the trust settles there's no longer any derivative claim to bring. And the analogy of course in the corporate world is that if a corporation settles a claim that settlement is final. If there's a shareholder that objects to that settlement its remedy is to sue the corporation and the directors for some kind of breach. But the actual derivative claim is no longer available. And of course that's exactly the situation we have here where for the last

four years ago there really has been no claim that can be brought either directly or derivatively.

So we've had some discussions with the plaintiffs.

The -- you know, we personally think that the plaintiffs here whose clients got all of the information relating to the settlement, they -- I don't know whether their particular clients voted for it or against it, again, they were overwhelming voted for it, but would have received all of the information with respect to the settlement four years ago.

We included information with respect to the settlement in a number of different pleadings. Both in our reply to the motion to dismiss, the amended complaint here, and also in connection with both the motions for the appeal of the change to the derivatives procedures order, and also with the motion to withdraw the reference. And so the plaintiffs have certainly known about this settlement and should have known about it for the last four years.

THE COURT: Well maybe apropos of the prior matter maybe it makes sense to have a brief conversation in chambers to talk about this a couple feet apart across the table, if that would be acceptable to you folks. Is that acceptable?

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, Jason Davis of Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd --

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	Page 58
1	THE COURT: Yes.
2	MR. DAVIS: for the plaintiffs. Yes, we think
3	that's an excellent suggestion.
4	THE COURT: Okay.
5	MR. DAVIS: And we support it.
6	THE COURT: All right. So why don't we do that,
7	Mr. Slack. And then, Ms. Marcus, we'll take this one first,
8	and then we'll come back and we'll go back to the California
9	matter.
10	MS. MARCUS: That's fine, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: All right?
12	(Recessed at 11:05 a.m.; reconvened at 12:05 p.m.)
13	THE COURT: You don't have to take you can keep
14	your stuff there, it's okay.
15	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible) papers for
16	Lehman.
17	THE COURT: That's okay. Oh, they're Lehman
18	papers.
19	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.
20	THE COURT: Okay. I seem to have lost everyone.
21	Here they come. Here they come.
22	(Pause)
23	THE COURT: All right. We're going to go back on
24	the record in LBHI with respect to the plan administrator's
25	supplemental objection to the four hundred and thirty-first

Page 59 1 omnibus objection to claims, the various claims filed 2 against BNC Bank. And having listened to the arguments of counsel 3 we'll take the matter under advisement and allow the parties 4 5 an additional period of time to continue discussions among 6 themselves regarding further proceedings. 7 I think it's best, especially since it's August, 8 to let you do that on your own schedule, with the 9 understanding that I do want to keep moving this along 10 because it's been pending for so long. But, Ms. Marcus, if 11 I could impose on you to keep track of the time and contact 12 chambers perhaps, you know, at the very beginning of 13 September and let us know when you'd like to come back in 14 for further status. 15 MS. MARCUS: Of course, Your Honor. And we'll 16 coordinate it with Mr. Gwilliam --17 THE COURT: All right. MS. MARCUS: -- to make sure it's convenient. 18 THE COURT: And, Mr. Gwilliam, notwithstanding 19 20 fact that you can enjoy being in New York, if at the next time it would be better for you to appear telephonically by 21 22 all means we can arrange for that. 23 MR. GWILLIAM: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: All right? 25 MR. GWILLIAM: I may take you up on that.

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1	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you for
2	making the trip.
3	MR. GWILLIAM: I appreciate your time, Your Honor.
4	Thank you.
5	THE COURT: Thank you very much. Thank you.
6	MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Ms. Marcus, I
8	don't think there's anything else in the LBHI
9	MS. MARCUS: No that was the calendar.
10	THE COURT: calendar. Okay. Thank you very
11	much.
12	MS. MARCUS: Thank you.
13	THE COURT: If you folks would give me two minutes
14	to get my other file.
15	(Recessed at 12:07; reconvened at 2:05. p.m.)
16	THE COURT: All right. How is everyone?
17	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Very good, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: Okay. I'm ready when you are. How
19	are you, Mr. Rossman?
20	MR. ROSSMAN: Very good, Your Honor. How are you?
21	THE COURT: Okay.
22	MR. ROSSMAN: If I may, Andrew Rossman, Quinn
23	Emanuel on behalf of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.
24	If you'll indulge me, Your Honor, I think it would
25	be helpful is for me to first give you a brief overview of

Page 61 1 this case. I think this is the first time that we've 2 appeared before you in this matter. 3 THE COURT: It is and I'm happy to listen. I have 4 read everything that's --5 MR. ROSSMAN: I have no doubt. 6 THE COURT: -- been filed with some interest, so 7 I'm looking forward to hearing more. 8 MR. ROSSMAN: Great. So my essential game plan is 9 to give you a brief description of the dispute in general, 10 an overview of the motion, and then I'll take you through 11 what I think are the principle points. It is, of course, a 12 motion to amend. 13 THE COURT: Right. MR. ROSSMAN: And you have not only the motion, 14 15 but you have a clean copy and a redline copy of the proposed 16 second amended complaint. 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. ROSSMAN: Just so you follow the bouncing 19 ball. We file an amended complaint in December of 2014, as 20 to which there was no objection. Principal change there was 21 to add Barclays as a defendant. And there's factual 22 allegations added to, and then this amendment was filed in 23 June, as a motion I should say, as a proposed amendment. 24 So what's at stake here, Your Honor, is one swap. 25 This is a fixed for floating, what --

Page 62 1 THE COURT: Right. MR. ROSSMAN: -- we consider to be a plain vanilla 2 3 interest rate swap. 4 THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. ROSSMAN: The context of this is there was a 6 bond issuance that Lehman assisted the entity that owned 7 this building in Alexandria, Virginia which is a post office 8 that was used to finance the building. 9 THE COURT: Right. 10 MR. ROSSMAN: And bonds were floating rate bonds, 11 so the entity had a risk, it faced exposure, with respect to 12 interest rates. 13 THE COURT: Right. MR. ROSSMAN: So to hedge that, entered into a 14 15 swap with LBSF, which is a Lehman subsidiary that 16 principally enters into these types of transactions, and it 17 was a fixed for floating rate swap. 18 So we understand the economics here, the obligation of LCOR, I'll call it LCOR for short, but this is 19 20 the LCOR Alexandria entities --21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MR. ROSSMAN: -- who are the defendants, had an 23 obligation to pay a fixed rate of approximately 6.8 percent 24 on that swap. The duration of the swap, the swap matured in 25 2032 --

Pg 63 of 120 Page 63 1 THE COURT: In 2032. 2 MR. ROSSMAN: -- you're ahead of me already, Your 3 Honor, so for 24 years, Lehman's counterparty had an 4 obligation to pay 6.8 percent, 6.8005 percent I think is the 5 precise number, and received a floating rate, which was live 6 or plus I think it was 23 basis points. 7 THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. ROSSMAN: So slightly over three month live 8 9 or, which at the time was dramatically low. In fact, the --10 Your Honor's heard all about --11 THE COURT: Forward curve. 12 MR. ROSSMAN: -- the forward rate, forward curve. 13 So the relevant question is, primary relevant question, 14 economically speaking is, what was the interest rate for 15 instruments of this duration at that time period, and it was 16 less than 3 percent. 17 So what you had was an instrument that was 18 massively in the money for Lehman. If it stayed in place for 24 years, Lehman would get the interest of the 6.8 19 20 percent, and would be paying back something that was worth 21 less than 3 percent. 22 Lehman calculated that in the money value to be worth about \$24 million at the time of termination. So the 23 24 swap was terminated at LCOR's initiation using the LBHI

bankruptcy filing as the event of termination.

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They didn't

Page 64 1 terminate in September, they terminated in December, okay. 2 Instead of finding \$42 million in Lehman's favor 3 as the valuation, they actually swung past zero, and LCOR determined in its calculation statement that Lehman owed 4 5 LCOR \$6 million. And that was what was initially 6 challenged. It was challenged as an incorrect or sham even 7 calculation because it seemed so obviously wrong, and at the time the case was being handled by Weil Gotshal as debtor's 8 9 counsel. 10 THE COURT: Was that -- so the -- they went from market to loss that -- and that calculation was attached to 11 12 a complaint that was ultimately delivered? 13 Interestingly, Your Honor, they did MR. ROSSMAN: not file a proof of claim, and I think it's suspicious that 14 15 they didn't file a proof of claim, when they thought they 16 were owed \$6 million. I think one of the consideration, I'm 17 purely speculating, but perhaps they didn't want to sign 18 their name to a court pleading. THE COURT: So there is no filed proof of claim 19 20 for that amount? 21 MR. ROSSMAN: There's no filed proof of claim. 22 This is Lehman's adversary proceeding against LCOR. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 MR. ROSSMAN: Okay. So what Lehman's learned in 25 the course of first 2004 and then formal discovery in the

adversary proceeding is that, in fact, what LCOR did and did not disclose to Lehman is it entered into a replacement swap where Barclays stepped into the shoes of Lehman on the swap. Barclays took over the obligations to LCOR, inherited the benefit of the receipt of that high level of interest. And for that, it paid LCOR over \$15 million.

So LCOR received on a transaction or claimed that it suffered a loss of \$6 million, it actually entered into a replacement swap and received over \$15 million in cash for that.

We also learned that the individuals at Barclays who were involved in that swap were individuals who had responsibility while they were still employees of Lehman for creating and handling that transaction. So they were insiders to the transaction, they had the benefit of information that they had while they were under fiduciary obligation as employees to Lehman, they took it with them, including confidential information to Barclays when they went over with the sale of the broker dealer and took advantage of that to step into this high valuable swap.

And that is frankly, Your Honor, why we got involved in the case as conflicts counsel to handle the Barclays issue, Quinn Emanuel became involved at the end of 2014, November 2014, trained our attention on that issue and filed the amended complaint that included the addition of

1 the Barclays defendants in 2014.

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What we have also learned in the course of discovery, is that there were other entities involved, and it's worth taking a minute to make sure that Your Honor understands what the different defendants and opposed new defendants are and what their roles are.

So Barclays, it's pretty obvious they were the replacement swap provider, okay. LCOR and a related entity called PTO Holdings, which as I understand it, is the --

THE COURT: Patent and Trademark Office, PTO, right?

MR. ROSSMAN: Precisely, Alexandria PTO --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSSMAN: -- is that. The PTO Holdings entity is the immediate parent, if you will, of LCOR, which was a swap counterparty to Lehman, and that entity in turn, we believe, is owed by something called Rosegreen Trust, and ultimately that is owned by the related companies and/or their principals and families.

As you go further up the corporate chain, our visibility greatly diminishes, but that's our understanding based on the discovery that we have so far.

Mr. O'Toole is a related executive and he has had

-- I understand he's in the courtroom today, and he had
involvement in the events and we'll have a chance to go

through the specifics of that, okay.

you've got Barclays sort of one category, then you've got what I will call the LCOR parties, which are all the entities that are related or affiliated with the related companies, and ultimately the LCOR Alexandria entity that was a swap counterparty, and then you've got two other defendants who were involved in the transaction as advisors, Mr. Gross and the entity that he owns and controls called BWRA and they were brought in as one of two swap advisors, if you will, who were involved in the transaction. And they're one that we view as a culpable participant, both because of their involvement in the close-out and the replacement swap and behavior that we think is frankly, pretty shocking wrongdoing, and also because they were direct or indirect recipients of proceeds of the swap.

So we view them as liable, both in terms of -liable as transferees and liable as participants, and that's
also true of the other new defendants who were in the
related companies or LCOR chain. So those are three
categories of defendants that we have, Barclays running the
case, LCOR and PTO Holding is already in the case.

The new defendants are Rosegreen Trust, the related companies, Mr. Gross, BWRA and Mr. O'Toole. And I'll take a moment to walk through those.

What I would explain to Your Honor is what we

learned in discovery is that, in fact, this was supposed to be a market quote ISDA, so you understand how the market quote works, you go out to market, get four quotes, you take the middle of the average of the two, don't ask me why they made it four, this is what they did. In fact, what we understand is that they deliberately failed the market quote process, as part of a design, as part of a scheme to get to loss. And then come up with a calculation that suited them, rather than suited the economic reality.

So, for example, we see from BWRA a memorandum, this is one of the swap advisors, a memorandum a day prior to the effort to solicit quotes saying that there were no quotes, that's already failed the quote process. So they have, you know, foreordained, if you will, that they're going to get the result of note quotes.

And when you send someone out to do that, who knows how the market works, it's not very hard to achieve. So this Chatham Financial who is one of their advisors initially evaluated the value of the swap as I've described it to you on an economic basis, and told LCOR, and this is back in November, so interest rates were actually a little bit higher then than they were in December, rates continued to go down as things got more challenging in the economy, and the Government tried to help. The --

THE COURT: Meaning that the value of the swap

continued to move in LBSF's favor.

MR. ROSSMAN: The value of the swap from November to December moved in Lehman's favor.

THE COURT: Lehman's favor.

MR. ROSSMAN: Correct, exactly, Your Honor.

So in November, Chatham advises -- we have a memo about this, which we also got in discovery, that swaps were at \$19 million to Lehman. So promptly what the defendants do is they take Chatham out of that part of the work, they no longer ask Chatham to make a loss calculation, and they just instruct Chatham to go forth and do the quote process, because Chatham has relationships with the dealers in the market.

The quote process results in no quotes because that's how they designed it, and they tested the market beforehand, knew who the dealers were who were not interested in this, and dialed them up and told them to say no, and they said no, is effectively what we have alleged in the complaint and what we think we'll be able to show.

In fact, they knew that there was an actual quote, it wasn't just a quote, it was an actual transaction with Barclays before they went and failed the quote process, and that takes no -- you know, is no where reflected in the report showing it failed the quote process.

There was an indication of interest in Deutsche

Bank to ask for more documents, they didn't know how to handle that, other than to say, don't give Deutsche Bank more documents, and you know, we're going to treat that --we'll just ignore that and look for no's elsewhere.

deliberately failed. They went and calculated a loss not with reference to the Barclays swap that they actually did, okay, which reflected, you know, at least one marker, but with respect to their own calculation, and even made matters worse by adding into it a theoretical interest rate cap which the cost of the theoretical interest rate cap, which of course, they would never have needed because they already had a replacement swap with Barclays, which took care of all their interest rate risks.

So there's quite a bit of manipulation here that we learned about in the course of this. And what we've been trying to do since we've --

THE COURT: So they -- so eventually they terminate, right, and they send -- they do send the loss calculation?

MR. ROSSMAN: They do send a loss calculation, that's right. And that's the one that reflects \$6 million in their favor.

But they don't file a proof of claim, they don't pursue it. They simply keep the proceeds of the Barclays

Page 71 1 swap. And our beef with Barclays, to be clear, Your Honor, 2 is two-fold. One is, we think that Barclays took advantage of Lehman information, because the Lehman employees went 3 4 over to Barclays --5 THE COURT: Was there anything -- so the question 6 that might be outside the purview of what you're prepared to 7 talk about though --8 MR. ROSSMAN: Sure. 9 THE COURT: -- was there anything in the APA that dealt with this very situation? Because obviously the APA 10 11 specifically contemplated that many, many of the Lehman 12 employees would transition over to Barclays. 13 So is the --14 MR. ROSSMAN: That's right. 15 THE COURT: So is the use by these individuals of 16 this information in and of itself wrongful? 17 MR. ROSSMAN: We think so, Your Honor. And that's 18 one of the allegations that we make in the complaint. That 19 the use of the information was wrongful. Okay. And we 20 don't think it's sanctioned by the APA. 21 THE COURT: So the transaction stayed. Barclays 22 didn't own the transaction, obviously LBSF owned the 23 transaction. 24 MR. ROSSMAN: Correct. 25 THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. ROSSMAN: Okay. So Barclays not only benefitted by using the information, they benefitted because, you know, economically they got a dramatically in the money swap, and they got it at, you know, a below market price, and we believe what -- you know, one of the things that we'll be exploring, one of the things that we allege, Your Honor, is that it was -- what LCOR was looking for was a cooperative participant, not a true arm's length dealer who had given the full price, but someone who was willing to go along with their scheme to give them a replacement swap which they needed to get rid of their interest rate risk. THE COURT: So 15 is a pretty good price for 42 of value? MR. ROSSMAN: We think it's a sweetheart price, that's right. Okay. But Barclays has objected to the amendment, that amendment stands. Barclays hasn't objected to this amendment. What we're here today -- why we're here today is because the LCOR defendants or LCOR and PTO have made an objection primarily to our addition of new parts, and the new part is what we explained, that are affiliates to PTO or LCOR or advisors to them, and that's what their objection is. Now, I say, Your Honor, we are very cognizant of the limited resources of the Court that are stretched by

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this case, and we are cognizant of our limited resources, and we wouldn't be chasing things that we think don't have value or that don't have supportable legal positions.

Here, we think it clearly has both. Our concern, very frankly, Your Honor, is that when we've spent time, and I'll be very careful as Mr. Tizzaio (ph) was in his affidavit not to reveal any settlement communications or offers of settlement.

But what we are very concerned about is we were being told by individuals representing LCOR and PTO that we should have reason to fear that we're not ever going to be able to collect the judgment against these entities.

They very much led us both in settlement discussions and in the incompleteness of their production, I think frankly very suspicious, incompleteness of their production in discovery, they led us to believe there wasn't money available to answer a judgment. That the money had to move, the money was gone, with respect to PTO Holdings that have the proceeds of the Barclays swap, and that we would end up, you know, chasing a -- you know, if not a bankrupt entity, an entity that was unable to answer the judgment.

And that caused us to take a deeper look, frankly, and to try to get an understanding of where the funds went, and who were the individuals involved. At the same time -- well, actually later, up through and including October of

2014, we got some of the most interesting documents. As
Your Honor knows from private practice, frequently is at the
end of the discovery rainbow and you actually get the most
relevant documents, they finally produce to us documents
that reveal the true role and the true culpability of Mr.
Gross, BWRA and others in this scheme.

So, you know, we were aware of the names of the individuals, we were aware that they were involved, Mr. O'Toole, Mr. Gross were involved in discussions seeing if we could get a settlement of this case, okay, but what we didn't realize until we saw some frankly pretty shocking documents, that they were actually involved in concocting the scheme.

And that as individuals, not only do they have their, you know, fingers dirty with the wrongdoing, but they actually were recipients of proceeds. They received an economic benefit including in the case of BWRA, Mr. Gross' entity, he threatened suit against the LCOR PTO Rosegreen entities when he didn't get adequately paid for the transaction.

And he was asking for at one point as much as a million and a half dollars because he described, he delivered to them effectively a windfall of some close to \$16 million, and he wanted to get paid for that. And he threatened to expose this by bringing a lawsuit, and they

ultimately settled with him, frankly buying his cooperation, keeping him quiet for a payment of \$200,000 plus a 5 percent interest in the outcome of this case.

so whatever proceeds, you know, they think they may keep at the end of this following, you know, litigation or a settlement, he's entitled to 5 percent of that under their settlement.

So it was seeing that document, and obviously these things take time, Your Honor, we've got to actually get the documents, upload the documents, review the documents, find them and appreciate their significance.

And we realized, okay, you know, there are people here who are involved in the wrongdoing, who should be held to account for their conduct, and maybe recipients of proceeds.

So, you know, I'll take you, Your Honor, if I may to, you know, why we want to amend and what we did with this amendment.

So we -- having the benefit of this discovery, we made an effort to try to give a more detailed recitation of the facts, okay, incorporating the documents that we received at the end of 2014.

So sequence of events is received those documents, we've trained our attention on the Barclays amendment and submitted that amendment. And we told all of the defendants

at the time in January that we intended to amend the gap.

So we sort of put the case on hold while we sorted through
all those documents, and made our effort to try to come up
with a comprehensive pleading so everyone would know, you
know, exactly what's at stake in the case.

And, you know, we expect there may be motions filed against this pleading, the test of litigating this pleading, we wanted to make sure that it had all of the relevant facts in it. And we wanted to make sure that we were for the benefit of creditors, that we were recovering all of the potential parties who may have received transfers because we didn't have complete knowledge or visibility into where all the money went.

So that's what we did. If you look at to -- if you don't like reading redlines, which I find intolerable, you can look on pages 6 through 10 of our opening brief, and we explain entity-by-entity what it is that we did in the amended complaint, starting with Mr. O'Toole.

Mr. O'Toole is a beneficiary of the Rosegreen

Trust, he's an executive related, he had control over these entities, and frankly was one of the individuals who masterminded this scheme. In addition to his direct involvement, he received a pay-out of \$185,000 from the Barclays swap proceeds.

Related and Rosegreen, talk about what those

entities are. We think they're the true parties in interest, or beneficial owners above LCOR and PTO Holdings, and you see reference in the documents we got ultimately from BWRA and Chatham, that they believed they were acting on behalf of those entities.

So, for example, when Chatham was out talking to the dealers in the marketplace, it represented itself as working on behalf of the related companies, because it wanted to tell the marketplace that it was acting a big important real estate concern, hoping that, you know, the dealers would play along.

Mr. Gross and BWRA as I mentioned were advisors.

Mr. Gross described himself as Mr. O'Toole's favored

financial engineer in correspondence, when he was seeking

his additional fee, and you know, he's the one who brought

the potential claim that resulted in settlement that I

describe below.

An additional allegations in the complaint include exactly how they manipulated the market quotation process, including, you know, at one point instructing Goldman-Sachs to respond no to a request for a market quotation.

So primarily that's what we did, is added additional defendants, and add substantial additional facts, Your Honor. We've also narrowed the theories of liability. We've eliminated a couple of causes of action, mindful of

your rulings in the Raymond James' case and other similar cases, so there's the money had received and turnover claims are eliminated. We don't want to waste any time on that.

And, you know, as I mentioned, you know, trying to make sure that we've got the complete set of potential defendants, based on what we see is the flow of funds.

Now, I want to talk about, if I can, Your Honor, some legal issues that relate to this. As you know, as anybody who remembers anything from civil procedure knows, leave to amend is freely granted. And, you know, here we don't think there's a serious dispute that we met the Rule 15(a) standard for adding additional factual allegations.

So the allegations that we have against Barclays, the allegations we have against existing defendants, clearly those fit within that very generous standard, where you can amend, years later you can amend, during trial to conform evidence, essentially Rule 15 is trying to say the Court should disputes on the merits.

THE COURT: Sorry. So the real interesting question here is the new parties.

MR. ROSSMAN: Correct. So let's talk about that.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSSMAN: So as opening matter, LCOR and PTO don't have standing to oppose our claims against new defendants. What the new defendants could have done, and

chose not to do, is they could have intervened for the limited purpose of opposing the amendment, arguing futility or the statute of limitations, they had a right to do that -

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSSMAN: -- people do that in cases. They didn't do that. They lie in the weeds and they relied on, you know, their close comrades in LCOR and PTO Holding, but we think it's quite clear and we cite, among other cases, the WSA, Inc. versus ACA case in the Southern District 1996, they don't have standing to make that assertion.

So we think the lack of standing bars their objection and ends the debate right there.

I will, you know, for sake of completeness, Your Honor, talk about the other issues. We talked about, you know, the general standard under Rule 15. I think what we're really considering here is the question of whether there is a futility problem, because the additional defendants are protected by a statute of limitations, and leave to amend should be denied because it would be a futility.

A couple of things I want to walk you through,

Your Honor. The -- first I want, because it relates to two
elements here, which is the element of undue delay and the
element of good faith. I want to take a minute and walk you

through the timeframe of our involvement in these allegations, okay.

What they've got to show, and the cases make it clear, is you've got to show that there was not just really delay, but there was undue delay. So we cite numerous cases, including a Second Circuit called Richardson Greenshields which collects a whole bunch of interesting cases, that say you can have years and years of delay, you can amend during the course of trial, you can file long after you knew about the new facts, all of this is permitted by Rule 15, it's not undue delay.

The good faith prong really you've got to show something that is in the nature of bad faith, on the part of Lehman. And we would come to Your Honor and say, we have nothing but good faith, but I will demonstrate to you all of the diligence and all of the effort that we made to come to the right answer here.

ADR process in this case, we try to settle before we even file, we had a mediation process pursuant to Judge Peck's order mandatory mediation back in March of 2012, that was unsuccessful. And that was unsuccessful, Lehman took it onto itself to try to settle outside of the mediation before it filed anything, so in May of 2013 there was another set of settlement meetings. Mr. Tizzaio is in the courtroom and

submitted an affidavit. Attended those, and had discussions with both Mr. Gross --

THE COURT: So during that time frame without getting into the substance of the settlement discussions, you were more or less dealing with this as simply a plain vanilla swap termination.

MR. ROSSMAN: That's -- well, I wasn't, because I wasn't in the case yet, but that's correct.

THE COURT: Right. So it was being dealt with as a plain vanilla swap termination, and the question of we view this as very much in the money to Lehman, why doesn't LCOR agree.

MR. ROSSMAN: Correct.

THE COURT: In other words, there wasn't the visibility into -- behind the curtain of what had happened.

MR. ROSSMAN: That's right, Your Honor. And there was -- Lehman had some information, it had some 2004 discovery, but you know, that's the way it was initially viewed in the case. Although as the discussions went on, and you know, it was being told by Mr. O'Toole and Mr. Gross that Lehman's never going to find the money, Lehman's never going to get an effective judgment against these entities, of course, you know, Lehman started to grow concerned that there was more going on here.

But truthfully it wasn't until the discovery that

Page 82 came in towards the end of 2014, did we really have a full understanding of exactly the level of manipulation here and the basis for additional claims. So just to continue to walk through the process. THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. ROSSMAN: The initial claim was filed November of 2013 by Weil, and you'll see it's a relatively unremarkable complaint that's attacking the close-out, Your Honor, as you've seen many variations of that. And then there's another settlement meeting because, you know, as you well know, we try very hard to settle these rather than litigate where we don't have to in June of 2014, where Mr. Tizzaio was, you know, effectively being taunted by, you know, the PTO and LCOR representatives there, which included Mr. O'Toole that they're never going to get a judgment. So, you know, we very much, at that point, started getting concerned, and discovery was pressed, and in the last production of documents in October of 2014, we got, among other things, a bank statement that showed the PTO

Holdings account at I believe Bank of America had been emptied out, and there were no funds in it.

And if you would, Your Honor, if you look at Exhibit J to Mr. Califano's declaration --

THE COURT: I actually did not bring that out with

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Page 83 1 MR. ROSSMAN: Ah, we've got one. 2 THE COURT: Do you have an extra copy? 3 (Pause) 4 MR. ROSSMAN: It's hiding in plain sight, Your 5 Honor. 6 May I approach, Your Honor? 7 THE COURT: Sure. If I bring out all the paper on a Lehman day, there won't be room for me to sit, so thank 8 9 you. 10 MR. ROSSMAN: I understand that. 11 THE COURT: So does counsel know, do you know the 12 page that Mr. Rossman's referring to? 13 MR. CALIFANO: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. CALIFANO: I have my declaration here. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. ROSSMAN: So what it is, is a spreadsheet and 18 you'll see in the column labeled redemption, on August 2nd, 19 2012, a redemption in the amount of \$14.915 million. And 20 shows as of that date a zero balance in the account. This 21 is all we got in discovery. 22 So we had reason to believe that the account was 23 emptied, and we have people telling Mr. Tizzaio, you're 24 never going to collect. So, you know, Lehman had good 25 reason to be concerned about how it was going to get back

the value that was taken from it, the swap transaction, who were the recipients who were unjustly enriched, who got the benefits of what was in this account on the Barclays swap.

So that's October 2014, we were retained in November, and filed the Barclays complaint, is first amended complaint in December. And January 12th, 2015, we told LCOR that we intended to file an amended complaint, to put everything on hold.

We provided a draft, it took a long time to get through the documents, and frankly we got human resources of the estate to be able to review and give us clearance on some of these things. We had a draft of the complaint that we provided April 17th. LCOR, they would not consent to the amendment. We had some confidentiality issues that we had to sort through, some additional as we prepared to file the complaint, we found additional documents we wanted to include, we had to go through the confidentiality drill again. June we filed.

THE COURT: I think that in the interest of moving along, I think that the issues -- you've done a good job of presenting the timeline with respect to the issue of delay, undue delay, timing regarding the amendments and otherwise.

I think that to the extent that you have more to say about the futility argument, so to speak, maybe we could move to that.

MR. ROSSMAN: Let me turn to that, Your Honor.

The one thing I did -- the last thing I want to mention on this, and I do feel that -- you know, a little bit attacked on the subject so I've taken my time to go through it.

THE COURT: Well, this is -- the replacement of counsel has led to a dramatic and drastic reformation of Lehman's theory of the case. So, you know, a number of things in all these pleadings stand out, and that statement stands out. So what you've said is that as this ripened into a litigation, as opposed to a claims resolution, your firm stepped in as conflicts counsel, not necessarily smarter or better counsel, just different counsel.

MR. ROSSMAN: That's right, Your Honor. And as we learn more shocking developments in the case, right.

So the last thing I just wanted to mention quickly, Your Honor, when we were -- when we delivered the information, the new post amended complaint to Mr. Califano and his firm, they told us that we were wrong, that in fact, the money was there, in the PTO Holdings account, and they gave us information about that.

What it turns out is, the money had been moved out of the account, there's no money in the Bank of America account anymore. Apparently money was moved into an account at Signature Bank, okay, which we didn't know, and they will provide us discovery of that, and maybe an issue we take up

Page 86 1 later why they didn't provide the discovery of that, clearly 2 it was called for. 3 And they showed us an account statement, and when 4 we got that, we amended our draft complaint, we revised our 5 draft complaint to take out that allegation, and to take 6 them at their word. 7 Now, we don't, you know --THE COURT: So is the money still in an account in 8 9 the name of PTO? 10 MR. ROSSMAN: That's what Mr. Califano has said in 11 his filings. 12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 13 MR. ROSSMAN: We don't know the reality, we haven't completed discovery, and frankly seeing the money 14 15 bouncing around concerns. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. ROSSMAN: But the point is, we listened. We did revise the complaint and we filed it. So all of this is 18 19 to say, you know, the actions were taken in good faith. So 20 now I turn to futility, okay. 21 As I already mentioned, to the extent that we add 22 new factual allegations as opposed to new defendants, there's no question it's not futile. I don't think there's 23 24 a serious debate about that. So really what we're talking 25 about are claims against new defendants.

Two different things to keep your eye on here,

Your Honor. To the extent there were transfers that were

made within six years of the filing of this complaint, June

2015, there's zero debate that those are timely, okay. We

don't have to contort ourselves with relation back and the

meaning of Rule 15(c) which we'll get into in a minute.

And there's -- we don't know, because we don't have complete visibility into everything that was transferred, but we're aware of one such transfer, we're aware that in September 2010, there was a \$200,000 payment to BWRA as part of the settlement. That is clearly timely.

Our claim is for unjust enrichment, as part of the, you know, it was paid indirectly through related, but it was paid out of the Barclays proceeds, and we think under any view of the case, that's a timely claim.

So now we get to our fed court's lesson today, which is relation back.

THE COURT: Relation back, right.

MR. ROSSMAN: So what you've got to meet for relation back is three elements. You've got to show that the claims arise out of the same conduct transaction occurrence. It's actually -- that's a very lack standard, and that's easily met here. I think they make a make-way argument on that, but I don't think I need to take up much of the Court's time, it's the same swap, close-out and the

replacement swap that we're talking about.

Second is the question of whether the new defendants received notice of the lawsuit. They clearly received notice of the lawsuit, they were involved in settlement discussions going back to 2013 there. They're quite aware of this case, and there's no prejudice to them at all, which is a critical point to be made here, Your Honor, and you know, prejudice is one of the principal factors in considering a Rule 15 motion. None is really alleged on the part of the LCOR defendants.

interest at least to Your Honor is the requirement that the new defendants knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against them but for a mistake concerning the proper parties' identity. And that's Rule 15 -- it's a tongue twister, but it's Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(II) is the mistake prong of relation back under Rule 15(c).

And one of the reasons why I spent the time and energy to walk you through the timeline is for you to understand that what you have is an effort by Lehman in good faith to sort out the bodies. We're trying to understand in this complex web of companies that we don't, you know, have, these are not public companies, we don't have clear visibility into these entities. We're trying to sort out who are the responsible parties.

And that doesn't just involve understanding of corporate ownership relationships and the names of the people, and the names of the entities, it also involves understanding what their role was. It also involves understanding what their culpability was for the underlying wrongdoing that's alleged.

And the other piece of this puzzle is following the money, which we tried to do, and we got incomplete information on that as well.

So when we thought that we, you know, saw that there was no money in the account, you know we pursued that with more vigor. For some of these individuals, we were able to see transfers to them, and we've made allegations of unjust enrichment based on those transfers. We don't know that we have a complete set of everything. So those are the two things that we set out to do.

Now, on 15(c)(1)(C)(II), basic argument that we're met with here, is that you can't add new parties as to opposed to substituting a mistaken party. So they rely on a case called Barrow, which was decided in the Second Circuit, and their interpretation of Barrow is that mistake means that you name party A when you intended to name party B, and you've got to substitute B for A, okay.

Since Barrow, the Supreme Court stepped in, and decided in the Krepsky (ph) case that that's not right.

That's not the focus. And, in fact, the focus is on the knowledge or understanding of the potential defendants, not what's in the plaintiff here Lehman's mind, right.

So the question is, did the defendants have reason to know that they were but for a misunderstanding on the part of the plaintiff that they were parties that would have been sued.

And on that, we have two bases, Your Honor, to reach that conclusion, which we think we're clearly entitled to.

First, let's make sure we understand the law. We cite in our brief, three recent Southern District cases, three different judges, okay, respected judges, where they all come to the conclusion that you can name additional parties. They're of course clearly wrong about that legal point.

Krepsky says that if you got a mistake, if you are mistaken as to the role or the culpability of the other defendants that you now want to name that that meets mistake under Rule 15(c). And as a --

THE COURT: So that's SRAL Gallery and Rico

Navarro (ph) and Lon Disponk (ph) and the Abdel (ph) case,

right?

MR. ROSSMAN: Exactly, Your Honor. Exactly, Your Honor. And these frequently involve -- the SRAL case is one

Page 91 that involves executives of a company, and the need to develop an understanding of exactly what that role was, and their culpable participation before they could name them as defendants. The Abdel case involved police officers, many of these cases happened in Ninth Section 1983 context or a, you know, claims against --THE COURT: Well, and then you also have Randall's Island Family Golf (ph) which had --MR. ROSSMAN: Which is a transfer case. THE COURT: Which is a transfer case, significantly which is a transfer case. MR. ROSSMAN: That's right, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah. MR. ROSSMAN: And we think the Randall's Island case is a great example of facts similar to these, where you don't know exactly where the money is going. But the important point here is we had an imperfect understanding of where the money went, we had an imperfect understanding of what the roles were of the various players. And as that understanding evolved, we made a good faith effort to name them. And the individuals, because they're so closely tied in to the entities that were already defendants, they well knew, they well knew what

their role was, they well knew what their culpability was.

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They anticipated this litigation in the settlement agreement between BWRA and LCOR specifically anticipates the possibility of a Lehman dispute, and what happens in the case of a Lehman dispute.

So we think there's no question there we meet the Krepsky standard. We don't think you have to resolve the question of whether Barrow is good law or bad law, in order to reach the conclusion that the judges did in those three cases that the claim is good.

The last thing I'll mention on the statute of limitations, Your Honor, is we've got an independent basis under state law. So Rule 15(c)(1)(A) says -- federal rules, says that if you're timely under the law of the jurisdiction whose claim it is, here it's New York, okay it's an unjust enrichment claim in New York, then you're timely, irrespective of whether you meet the federal standard.

And New York has under the CPLR, Section 1024, has a specific codification of John Doe practice. And here what we named is John Doe's in the original complaint, and in the amended complaint, were recipients, John Doe 1 through 10, recipients of the Barclays swap proceeds.

And we did that because we knew we had imperfect information, and we knew we'd have to sort out the bodies. They knew that they, you know, were among those John Does. And in addition to having a right to amend them in the

federal standard, we have a right to amend under the state standard under Section 1024.

And the last thing I'll remind Your Honor, and then I will sit down, is that you've already answered the question, the Raymond James' case about substantively whether we stayed a claim for unjust enrichment, despite the fact that there is a contract here. It's conduct that's outside of the contract like the Building (ph) case as you said in your decision in Raymond James. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rossman.

MR. CALIFANO: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. CALIFANO: Mr. Rossman told a very interesting story, but it really doesn't have anything to do with this motion. And I think the way to frame this is to look at the pleading, look at the first amended complaint, and what that would have given defendants notice on, and what they've proposed second amended complaint.

Now, the story about the investigation they did and the facts they found isn't reflected in the complaint.

Because if you look at paragraph 128 --

THE COURT: Why would it be reflected in the complaint? The complaint is the product of the investigation, if the allegations against the defendants.

Page 94 1 MR. CALIFANO: Yes, but it's not -- the complaint 2 that is supposedly the result of their investigation, and the claim, the claim for relief, the unjust enrichment 3 4 claim, Your Honor, while there are facts, there are not 5 elements of the claim against these new defendants, because 6 it still relates to, as a result, of LCOR's action, 7 paragraph 129. 8 THE COURT: Okay. We need to reset. This is a 9 motion for leave to amend the complaint. 10 MR. CALIFANO: Yes. 11 THE COURT: This is not a motion to dismiss the 12 causes of action. So you're starting at a rather different 13 place than I expected you to go. 14 MR. CALIFANO: Well, Your Honor, the case law does 15 say when you oppose a motion to amend, based on futility, 16 the 12(b)(6) standards. 17 THE COURT: I understand that, but you are 18 deliberately choosing not to address head on virtually 19 everything that Mr. Rossman said. 20 MR. CALIFANO: Your Honor, what Mr. Rossman said 21 about the background doesn't relate to the fact that they're 22 seeking to amend and add these new defendants, Your Honor. 23 Because the original complaint --24 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. CALIFANO: -- had the unjust enrichment claim

Page 95 1 and it was based on the claim of LCOR's actions --2 THE COURT: That's right. 3 MR. CALIFANO: -- in the (indiscernible). Okay? THE COURT: Right. 4 5 MR. CALIFANO: The second amended complaint --6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. CALIFANO: -- as the unjust enrichment still relating to LCOR's actions not the actions of these new 8 9 defendants. The case hasn't changed, Your Honor. After --10 THE COURT: Well -- I'm going to keep interrupting you because first, there's the issue of standing. 11 12 MR. CALIFANO: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Which is a real issue. MR. CALIFANO: Yes, Your Honor, but there is a 14 15 case AgriStone (ph), I just had it here a second ago, which 16 dealt with that issue. And said -- while this is AgriStone 17 Meat & Poultry v Mariah Capital, Northern District Iowa, 18 Eastern Division, while the legal authority on this issue appears to be limited, the cases support a view that a 19 20 current defendant may assert futility on behalf of a 21 prospective defendant. 22 This result would seem to have particular 23 application in this case, when the four prospective 24 defendants have a close legal relationship with the current 25 defendant, and it appears likely that all the defendants

Page 96 1 would be represented by the same attorneys. 2 THE COURT: Are all the defendants going to be 3 represented by the same attorneys here? 4 MR. CALIFANO: Your Honor, we're here today, you 5 know, representing the new defendants. 6 THE COURT: You are? 7 MR. CALIFANO: Well, we're here on their behalf, 8 objecting to the amendments. 9 THE COURT: Those are two different things. You're appearing as counsel for LCOR Alexandria LLC --10 11 MR. CALIFANO: Yes. 12 THE COURT: -- and PTO Holdings. MR. CALIFANO: Right. 13 THE COURT: So if you're telling me that you're 14 15 going to be representing all reputed defendants, that's a 16 fact that --17 MR. CALIFANO: I wholly represent the new defendants, I haven't had that conversation with Mr. 18 19 O'Toole, but he does --20 THE COURT: And there might be -- I mean, not to 21 make the suggestion, but there might be diversions of 22 interests among the various parties at a certain point. But 23 if you get there, I assume you'll deal with that. 24 MR. CALIFANO: If we get there, we'll deal with 25 that, Your Honor.

Page 97 1 THE COURT: But the timeline that Mr. Rossman laid 2 out for 45 minutes was detailing Lehman's following the 3 trail --4 MR. CALIFANO: Yes, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: -- of this transaction. And I don't -6 - and what I had expected to hear from you as a refutation 7 of that. MR. CALIFANO: Well, Your Honor, I was going to, 8 9 but I --10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. CALIFANO: -- wanted to frame it in the 12 context of their amended complaint in their pleading, because while they say -- first of all, they knew of the 13 14 Barclays swap back in 2009. They knew at that time in the 15 2004 discovery, because there was discovery done before. 16 THE COURT: Sure. 17 MR. CALIFANO: So they knew about the Barclays 18 swap. 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. CALIFANO: They knew about those transactions. 21 THE COURT: But that's --22 MR. CALIFANO: But subsequent --23 THE COURT: Let's pause on that, okay. Because of 24 all the derivative transactions that come through this room, 25 this is one of the simpler ones, this is one of the simpler

Page 98 1 ones. So you have something that in the absence of 2 something that frankly I can't imagine sitting here now, you 3 have a swap, the transaction that is demonstrably in the money to LBSF, I know that's a shocking concept to people, 4 5 because Lehman quote/unquote filed, but in your pleadings 6 you also seem to suggest or feel that there's something 7 untoward or inappropriate about the non-defaulting party 8 having to pay the --9 MR. CALIFANO: No, Your Honor, I --10 THE COURT: -- opposing party money. So that --11 it's a swap, it's a contract dispute, right. 12 MR. CALIFANO: And we understand that. 13 THE COURT: Right. So you've got this, you know, dramatic fixed floating swap, and we have something that is 14 15 not at all straight forward. And there's -- I feel there's 16 this attempt being made to divert attention from the very 17 basics of the transaction. 18 For example, I asked Mr. Rossman pretty quickly, is there a proof of claim, because I didn't see any mention 19 20 of a proof of claim. He clarified there's no proof of 21 claim. Why isn't there a proof of claim? 22 MR. CALIFANO: I don't know, Your Honor, I was not 23 at that time --THE COURT: It's kind of an odd fact. Most people 24 25 who are owed \$6 million try to collect \$6 million, right?

Page 99 1 The recoveries against the Lehman Estates are running pretty 2 well. So that's an odd fact. Okay. And when I read Title 3 18, makes me a little nervous because if what's being 4 alleged is true, whether there's a proof of claim or not, it's not a good thing. It's not a good thing. 5 6 MR. CALIFANO: And can I explain that? 7 THE COURT: Sure. Do you know what Title 18 is? MR. CALIFANO: Yes, I do. 8 9 THE COURT: If you read the language and conduct 10 in connection with the bankruptcy case, if the allegations are, in fact, what Mr. Rossman says they are, I have a 11 12 concern. 13 MR. CALIFANO: Well, which allegation would that 14 be, Your Honor? 15 THE COURT: Well, the allegation that if you take 16 the allegation that there was a plain vanilla swap, we'll 17 characterize it as that. There was an event of default that 18 gave rise to a termination right, no question about it. And then under the applicable ISDA there's a procedure that has 19 20 to be followed. 21 MR. CALIFANO: Right. 22 THE COURT: Okay. If -- and again if, if, if, 23 because I don't know, Mr. Rossman could be wrong on 24 everything that he says, if the allegations are correct, 25 there was instead of a \$42 million -- a process leading to a

- \$42 million payment to Lehman, there was a \$6 million loss. That's not, you know, a couple of million dollars swing where people were getting quotes at different times in the day, or people were using different costs of capital or other things that might come into play when you're figuring out loss.

 So you reacted particularly negatively to the use
 - of the word conspiracy, when in the plain English meaning of the word is a group of people working together to do something. So if the allegations are largely correct, then there was a concerted plan to take something that was in the money to Lehman and have Barclays step into the shoes, and on top of everything else, assert a loss.
- It's a fact pattern of interest. I obviously have no idea what's true.
- MR. CALIFANO: Right. But that was in the original complaint --
- 18 THE COURT: Yes.
 - MR. CALIFANO: -- Your Honor. That's what we've been dealing with since that original complaint was filed. We answered, we engaged in discovery. That is -- the reason why I started out by saying these stories are relevant, that's already in the original complaint. Okay. So those issues can be dealt with there.
- 25 THE COURT: But the role, the specific -- the

particular roles of the particular individuals and the particular movement of the money and arrangements could not have been known simply from the close-out, the plain vanilla swap closing.

MR. CALIFANO: If you're talking about the movement of money, the transaction of Barclays in creating the account of PTO, that was not --

THE COURT: The role of the new defendants, this is squarely within the three cases that Mr. Rossman pointed us to, what was not known was the role of the putative new defendants in the transactions that were --

MR. CALIFANO: I disagree, Your Honor, and I will tell you why, because these issues, the whole issue as to whether the market quotations were properly received, that was an issue that was dealt with in mediation, and that was an issue through the beginning of this case when Weil Gotshal were representing the plaintiffs. Those issues were there, all those issues.

Mr. Gross' role was all there, Mr. O'Toole's role, that was all part of the discovery, and part of the mediation statements, it's in the mediation statements the process.

So if they disputed the process, that was done then. The individual's roles were done then, and it's only factual because the individuals -- the corporations can only

act for the individuals.

And, Your Honor, I think if it was something that was truly discovered, the complaint here just adds allegations about these new defendants, and tries to shoehorn them into the unjust enrichment claim.

So there's not a fraud claim in here, there's not a civil conspiracy claim in here, this is a contract case, all right. At the end of the contract, there was money owed to one party in an amount to be determined, that's the issue. What happened subsequent to the termination didn't increase Lehman's damages at all, didn't change the nature of the damages at all. This is a breach of contract case.

The best their allegations are, are that people took an aggressive position, that's their allegation, and that's all there is, Your Honor. That is all there is. I mean, they've characterized it with a lot of adjectives, but it still doesn't change the fact that this is a contract case, Your Honor, and --

THE COURT: See, this is where we're not going to agree. This is more than a contract case. A contract case is there's an ISDA that has a close-out provision, and the parties have a reasonable disagreement about what the correct termination payment is.

This is dramatically different from a contract case. This complaint alleges a series of concerted actions

that were designed to achieve a windfall, that's the word that's used, purely, purely at Lehman's expense.

It was made possible by virtue of conduct of various parties working together. In a normal economic situation this wouldn't be the result. The notion that the -- I think that you and Mr. Rossman do not agree on the visibility of Lehman into what went on or around this transaction. You're quite right.

There was a Barclays' transaction, they knew about that. What they are saying in support of the motion to amend, consistent with cases in this district is that what they didn't understand until they had subsequent discovery was the particular role that each of the individuals played in the process.

MR. CALIFANO: And can I address something Your Honor said?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. CALIFANO: You said at Lehman's expense. What occurred and nothing occurred after the termination that increased or changed in the nature of their damages. There was nothing done at Lehman's expense after termination, and if the position is unreasonable that we've taken, then isn't the -- isn't there a remedy for summary judgment, as opposed to suing a number of individuals now on --

THE COURT: There's an allegation made that the

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individuals involved were in the process of settling, making it clear that Lehman was on a fool's errand because they would never get the money. Doesn't --

MR. CALIFANO: And first of all, I don't see how that could be the cause of an action, based on a cause of action, and I do think also, Your Honor, those were inappropriate, because they were in the context of settlement negotiations.

But in settlement negotiations, isn't the defendants' ability to pay always a question? Especially when you're looking and talking about situations like this. Defendants' ability to pay. So if somebody says in settlement discussion, you can get a large judgment, but you're not going to be able to enforce it.

THE COURT: I understand that, but this is somewhat different. Because what you have here is -- and it's -- you keep trying to focus me on what occurred after the Barclays' transaction and --

MR. CALIFANO: Well, Your Honor just referenced the settlement negotiations.

THE COURT: Well, I'm trying to focus on what happened before. Because what has been alleged in the complaint is that there was a plan that was implemented, it was culminated in the Barclays' transaction, all right. And the planning that went into that, as alleged, was a sham

market quotation process. And a realization that Barclays would be able to step into the shoes of Lehman for a good price, everyone was going to be a winner, except Lehman.

So the involvement of each of the newly named defendants in the process that culminated in the Barclays' transaction and then the funds being transferred after Barclays made the payment, that's what this is about.

MR. CALIFANO: I understand that, Your Honor, but first of all, without conceding the facts, and we're not addressing them today for purposes of this motion have taken as true, but even if that was the case, even if that was the case, Lehman doesn't have any damages, different or additional to the termination payment they may be entitled to. Which is what this case is all about.

Now, there's no issue --

THE COURT: They have unjust enrichment claims.

MR. CALIFANO: They don't, Your Honor, but let's just address the fact that there was a default. That default gave LCOR the right to terminate. That's not in dispute.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CALIFANO: Upon that termination, Lehman had the rights that they had, okay, they were fixed at that point, they were entitled or not entitled to obtain it on that swap termination.

What happened before that and after that didn't change the fact that their damages were fixed as of that termination. They can't get additional damages, and they can't get different damages.

The unjust enrichment claim, Your Honor, is -there's no basis for that. The Barclays' monies was never
monies that Lehman was entitled to. Okay. And the fact
that they're relying on subsequent transfers, at the very
best, if Lehman did have a claim to that money, then that
claim, that unjust enrichment claim accrued when the monies
were transferred to PTO. Because arguably, and there's no
legal basis for this.

If they argue that they had a claim to the particular Barclays' proceeds, okay, and there's no allegation in the complaint of any legal entitlement to the monies, then subsequent transfers don't start the clock running on unjust enrichment. Once it was transferred, once Lehman -- it was transferred from Lehman, which is what they're saying, which we dispute, that's when the unjust enrichment claim appeared.

The fact that they transferred money after that wouldn't start the clock running again, wouldn't start a new cause of action for unjust enrichment, because it wasn't taken from that. Because even taking their allegations at best --

Page 107 1 THE COURT: So --2 MR. CALIFANO: -- the transfer there, the unjust 3 enrichment occurred when the money is put in PTO. THE COURT: Is the money still in PTO? 4 5 MR. CALIFANO: The money is still in PTO and we 6 showed them that recently. I mean, we haven't given them a 7 daily balance, but I mean, the statement that he doesn't 8 know, we gave them the statement, where it is right now. 9 And they have an unjust --10 THE COURT: But then let me try and take you down 11 a different path. So if that's true, right, and in essence 12 what you're saying is, don't worry about all these other 13 guys, because the money's still in PTO, we're good for it. 14 MR. CALIFANO: No, what I'm saying is, Your Honor, 15 their claim that --16 THE COURT: I'm not --17 MR. CALIFANO: That they went after all the other 18 defendants because they thought the PTO money was gone, well 19 THE COURT: Well, I'm asking you a direct 20 21 question. If you're telling me that the, what we'll call 22 the Barclays' money is still in PTO, right --23 MR. CALIFANO: Yes. 24 THE COURT: -- then if this is, in fact, a plain 25 contract dispute, then why don't we just very quickly

Page 108 1 determine liability on the close-out of the swap? 2 MR. CALIFANO: Sure, we could do that, Your Honor, 3 and then we don't need to bring in all these causes of action. 4 5 THE COURT: Well, put that to one side. Lehman's 6 made an allegation that, you know, based on what you say, 7 arithmetic that the swap was \$42 million in the money to LBSF. It's a simple swap. It's a simple swap, right? So -8 9 - but where you're going with it is, you're going to, I 10 believe, attempt to establish that the market quotation 11 process was real, that there were no market quotes. 12 MR. CALIFANO: Yes, yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: And you have had a loss? 14 MR. CALIFANO: Yes. 15 THE COURT: How could you have a loss if you made 16 \$15 million? How could you have a loss if you made \$15 17 million? I don't understand that. 18 MR. CALIFANO: But it's not the issue for today. It's not the issue for today. 19 20 THE COURT: You have a very, very narrow view of what the issue is for today, and I have a much broader view 21 22 of what this is for today. MR. CALIFANO: Well, I'm here on this motion to 23 24 amend, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: All right. But your entire argument

has not been on a motion to amend. Your entire argument has been on a motion to dismiss, I think.

MR. CALIFANO: Yes, because we are responding to their motion to amend with the argument of futility, which is a 12(b)(6) standard as the cases say.

And I think the original complaint had this unjust enrichment claim, it had an unjust enrichment claim against PTO. If they believe that there is a valid unjust enrichment claim they're protected there. If there were transfers, if they were able to get a judgment and they were transferred, they have all those remedies. It's not the basis --

THE COURT: What do you mean they have all those remedies?

MR. CALIFANO: If they get a judgment, right, and then they see transfers, if fraudulent conveyance, and they can raise the fraudulent conveyance theory if they believe the money was transferred, they don't have to sue individuals at this point. Suing individuals, in addition to Mr. Gross and Mr. O'Toole where they do allege (indiscernible) receipts, they sue a number of other entities without even the basis -- without having the various allegation that a payment was received by them.

THE COURT: Well, the monies you just told me were in the PTO account, so PTO is directly or indirectly held by

two of the other defendants, right?

MR. CALIFANO: So you can't -- you have to have -you can't just sue the corporate parents without any
allegations, they have no passing allegations, they have no
allegations that the corporate parents were involved at all,
and related by the way, is not in the corporate chain at
all. Not in the ownership chain at all.

But you can't just add them because they're in the chain, you know, in the corporate ownership chain. And there's not a single allegation against those entities.

THE COURT: When you say those entities, which two entities?

MR. CALIFANO: There's not a single allegation against Rosegreen or related. Other than the fact that they may have received. But they know, they know where all the funds are. They know where all the PTO funds are. They can do the math. We've given them account statements, and they referenced a \$200,000 payment and a \$185,000 payment.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you let me hear from Mr. Rossman again.

MR. ROSSMAN: Unless Your Honor has questions,

I'll be super brief. I hope the money's there, okay, we

don't have a current account statement, I'd like to, I'd

like to get a confirm that it's there and will be there.

Here's among other things that we know --

Page 111 1 THE COURT: So you want more than \$15 million, 2 though, right? 3 MR. ROSSMAN: Your Honor, we do, and we want to 4 have the -- we want to be able to collect, because we think 5 damages exceed that. But we don't -- certainly the full 6 15.64 million that was received from Barclays, our 7 understanding is that's not at PTO Holdings anymore, because 8 there have been distributions. 9 Related received \$275,000 on December 15th, 2008. 10 Mr. O'Toole received \$185,000. 11 THE COURT: Gross, is it Gross? 12 MR. ROSSMAN: Mr. Gross, BWRA received 200,000 in 13 2010 in the settlement that I mentioned, he'd received 14 20,000 back in December 29 of 2008, and a million dollars 15 was distributed to investors, including \$652,500 to an 16 entity called Related GSA LLC. Which has --17 THE COURT: And what about the Rosegreen Trust? 18 MR. ROSSMAN: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 19 THE COURT: The Rosegreen Trust. 20 MR. ROSSMAN: The Rosegreen Trust, we don't --21 pardon me one second, Your Honor. 22 MR. CALIFANO: Your Honor, if I may. 23 THE COURT: Yeah. 24 MR. CALIFANO: I just want to note that not one of 25 these allegations are in the complaint. So I don't know if

he's amending his complaint right now.

MR. ROSSMAN: No.

MR. CALIFANO: But these allegations aren't in the complaint.

MR. ROSSMAN: Your Honor, we don't know whether there's been a specific transfer to Rosegreen or not. What we do understand from the documents that were produced in October of 2014 is that Mr. Gross and BWRA believed that they were working for Rosegreen, and I've got -- you know, got documents to show it, Your Honor.

I'm looking at a letter that was sent from Mr.

Gross' counsel at Ropes and Gray who's bragging about, you know, the value of the work that BWRA had done exceeding all expectations for a favorable result for Rosegreen.

So, you know, Your Honor, we don't know precisely where all this went. We made a game effort in the complaint, frankly a lot of elbow grease that went into it, to identify it as best we could. We were led astray in terms of where the money is. We don't have confirmation where the money all went, and we do have claims and potential damages that greatly exceed the \$15 million.

So I think the idea, you know, I'm fond of Your Honor's idea of running to a quick resolution of the value of the underlying swap against the counterparty and that's certainly we'd love to explore but we think we've got, you

know, damages that gone beyond that and want --

THE COURT: So --

MR. ROSSMAN: And the time for that is after the amendment when we sort it all out in discovery and --

THE COURT: Well, I'm just trying to figure out the best way to approach this. Because to the extent that, Mr. Califano, you're going to be representing everybody, right, then the facts are what the facts are with respect to the close-out.

MR. CALIFANO: Yes.

THE COURT: Right? So we could, and I am going to allow the amendment. I think that the standing question is interesting, but I don't think I even have to deal with it, because I think that the claims all relate back. And to the extent that there is a sense that some of -- that there may be some futility, I can take that up on motions to dismiss. But I'm going to allow the amendment.

What I would like to do is focus more on how we keep this from escalating into more of a drama than it already is, because I'm not a huge fan of drama.

So I'd like to go back to the notion that it's a simple contract dispute, and that will be what it will be, and it really, you know, all of the allegations that Mr.

Rossman has pointed out to in the complaint may come into play, particularly -- forget about, you know, payments and

Page 114 settlements around payments, just focusing on the close-out 1 2 process, market quotations, et cetera, we're going to have 3 to get to the bottom of that. So, you know, thinking out loud here, we could 4 5 fast track to a liability determination on the close-out, 6 and everybody's rights could be reserved in terms of whether 7 they, you know, ultimately have a right to be dismissed out, 8 you know, on any and all other grounds. But --9 MR. CALIFANO: The only issue is, Your Honor, that 10 we've not received discovery from Lehman. 11 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 12 MR. CALIFANO: We have not received discovery. We 13 have outstanding discovery from Lehman. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. CALIFANO: We have significant outstanding 16 discovery, so that needs to be factored into it. 17 THE COURT: Sure. MR. ROSSMAN: I don't think we're (indiscernible) 18 discovery either, Your Honor, but we're happy to provide. 19 20 THE COURT: Yeah, although I don't -- I just out 21 of curiosity, given that under the ISDA, it's the 22 counterparties obligation here, I'm just wondering what 23 exactly is the discovery that you expect to get from Lehman. 24 MR. CALIFANO: Well, we've had outstanding 25 requests for a significant period of time, so. And we

Page 115 1 haven't had a response to those requests. 2 THE COURT: Do you know, Mr. Rossman, what they 3 are? 4 MR. ROSSMAN: I don't know off hand, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. ROSSMAN: We've not even had a meet and confer 7 on that. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. ROSSMAN: We'll have to do that. 10 THE COURT: Well, perhaps you should do that, 11 because in the usual situation where it's the -- you know, 12 here in particular, where you have the premise of the loss, 13 going to loss under the ISDA is the failure of the quotation 14 process, that would have virtually nothing to do with 15 Lehman, you know, around the termination of this particular 16 ISDA. But, you know, you can have a meet and confer, and if 17 there's discovery that they're fairly entitled to, you ought 18 to give it to them, and we should, you know, we should go 19 from there. 20 But I'm with you in terms of keeping this to the, 21 you know, contract dispute that it is. But I think that 22 it's appropriate to amend the complaint, bring everybody in 23 as defendants who there have been allegations against, I 24 think their roles were not fully understood. And as time 25 goes on, their roles may be fully more understood, and there

Page 116 1 may be motion practice and all of your rights are fully 2 reserved in that regard. 3 MR. CALIFANO: Yeah, I would anticipate, Your Honor, that they -- well, we'll see what the second amended 4 5 complaint looks like, but I would anticipate that there's 6 significant legal deficiencies. 7 MR. ROSSMAN: Well, you know, what the second 8 amended complaint, you know, everyone knows what that looks 9 like, we'll file it with Your Honor's permission. We'll 10 meet and confer with them on discovery including our own --11 THE COURT: But I want to be --12 MR. ROSSMAN: -- need for discovery --13 THE COURT: I want to be clear. 14 MR. ROSSMAN: -- and proceed as quickly as we can. 15 THE COURT: You have whatever rights you have 16 under the federal rules to file whatever motions you believe 17 you can. But in terms of my overall management of the case, 18 I'm not going to entertain dispositions on multiple motions 19 to dismiss and keep everything else in abeyance. 20 MR. ROSSMAN: I understand. 21 THE COURT: We're going to run down parallel 22 tracks. All right? 23 MR. CALIFANO: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 25 MR. ROSSMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

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                THE COURT: Will you send us an order please, and
 2
      would you send it by Mr. Califano first?
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                MR. ROSSMAN: I will, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Thank you.
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      (Proceedings concluded at 3:22 PM)
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Page 120 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 We, Dawn South and Sheila G. Orms, certify that the 4 foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings Dawn South

| Digitally signed by Dawn South | DN: cn=Dawn South | DN: cn=Dawn South, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US 5 Date: 2015.08.06 14:51:19 -04'00' 6 7 Dawn South AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET**D-408
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Digitally signed by Sheila Orms
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Date: 2015,08.06 14:51:56-04/00' 8 9 10 Sheila G. Orms 11 12 13 Date: August 6, 2015 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Veritext Legal Solutions 23 330 Old Country Road 24 Suite 300 25 Mineola, NY 11501